Vol. 4 Issue 2

Articles

Additional material



Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies

Publisher
Åland Islands Peace Institute (ÅIPI)
http://www.peace.ax

Published at: http://www.jass.ax

Journal of Autonomy
and Security Studies
ISSN 2489-4265

About JASS

The Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies (JASS) is a peer-reviewed, open access e-journal published by the Åland Islands Peace Institute (AIPI), Åland, Finland. The journal addresses its overarching theme of peace and security from the perspectives of autonomy, demilitarisation, and minority protection.

Each issue of JASS will include scholarly articles that in some way deal with the subjects mentioned above. Before being accepted, all articles have been subject to a double-blind peer-review process. JASS issues may also include other types of contributions such as research notes, book reviews, and information on pending conferences. JASS is normally published twice a year – in the late spring and late autumn. As of 2020, JASS is included in the Directory of Open Access Journals, see www.doaj.org.

The editorial board invites articles and other contributions to JASS via the email address submissions@jass.ax and looks forward to proposals on articles, thematic issues, and other suggestions to make JASS a relevant and accessible scholarly journal in its field. It is appreciated if manuscripts sent to us have undergone language editing.



Preface

Migration is a phenomenon as old as humanity. Conflicts, armed and non-armed, are similarly as old as humanity". Both phenomena express the commitment of individuals and groups to change life – by necessity or ideology, and sometimes both. Most often at great cost for everyone involved.

In this issue of JASS we will have the opportunity to reflect on these two cardinal aspects of social life as they appear in the modern world and in today's political structures – with the European Union as a case in point.

Migration and wars are among the most profound upheavals of social order that humankind has to address – migration as a long-term, steady movement of individuals, and wars as a comparatively short-term and organized imposition of political and social structures. What security is, under such circumstances, is in itself a complex matter; unfortunately worsened under a year of a global pandemic.

JASS introduces in this Issue the concept of authors that are "early career researchers". It reflects an ambition of JASS editors to invite and introduce research-oriented advanced students, for example PhD level students, to the handicraft of article writing and early sharing of research findings – a skill that is of use throughout any academic career, and to the benefit of all the readers of JASS.

Kjell-Åke Nordquist
Editor-in-Chief

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EU Policy on Immigration and Integration: Multiculturalism or Assimilation?

Gustav Bolmberg

Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies,
4(2) 2020, 92–114

URL: http://jass.ax/volume-4-issue-2-Blomberg/

Abstract

During the last decades there has been an intense political contest about the mode of integration of third country nationals in the European Union (EU) and its member states. There is an ambiguity whether the union is first and foremost the champion of diversity and multicultural policies, or if it has returned to assimilative-oriented policies in the emerging modern form of civic integration policies. The backdrop is the growing assimilative practices and policies throughout the union. This paper will explore the existence of both assimilative-oriented/civic integration tendencies and tendencies of multiculturalism in recent immigration and integration policies of the EU by analysing the Commission's Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals from 2016. Special focus will be on finding out whether the Action Plan supports the hypothesis that the EU has entered into a distinct post-multiculturalism period. The conclusion of the article supports this hypothesis convincingly, showing that the plan contains evenly matched representations of both multicultural and assimilative-oriented/civic integration policies. Moreover, this article discovers clear representations of the intercultural policy paradigm, in addition to a heavy focus on economic instrumentalism and employment in the Action Plan´s integration policies.

Keywords

Multiculturalism, assimilation, civic integration, Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals, integration policies, immigrants, third-country nationals (TCNs), European Union, post-multiculturalism period

About the author

Gustav Blomberg holds a Master of Science in European Studies from the University of Gothenburg.

Acknowledgements

This article was written in spring 2020, before the EU Commission´s proposal for a New Pact on Migration and Asylum was released (September 2020), which is why the Pact is not discussed in the present text. It should also be noted that the article was largely written before the Corona Crisis. The author is also thankful for the two anonymous reviewers´ helpful comments, which greatly improved the text.

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) is established on the multicultural motto of 'United in Diversity', meaning that the differences among the countries on the geographical continent of Europe can be bridged through a shared common European heritage and identity. It also means that the EU must endorse cultural diversity among its member states (see the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, art. 167, title XIII). A set of common values such as respect for human rights, democracy and tolerance have become fundamental aspects of an EU identity – both externally and internally – which suggests a framework that accommodates multiculturality and cultural minorities (Modood et al. 2006, p. 13). The EU has moreover established the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in which the principles of religious and cultural diversity within member states are preserved. The idea of 'united in diversity' has not only been referred to in the context of the diversity of cultures and languages already existing in Europe but also with reference to the tolerance of immigrants[1] from countries outside the EU.

The idea has become a foundation in the European Commission's policies towards immigration and integration of immigrants from outside the union (Aggestam & Hill 2008, pp. 99, 105–106). Aggestam & Hill (2008, p. 106) hold that the EU's approach to immigration and integration has been "closest to some kind of multiculturalism in that the emphasis is on immigrants being able to preserve and practise their cultures and faiths". In formulating a common EU approach to immigration and integration policy the European Commission has actively accentuated immigrants' rights and that they should be given equal economic, cultural, social and legal rights without being expected to abandon their cultural identity (Aggestam & Hill 2008, p. 99; European Commission 2003; European Commission 2011, European Commission 2016).

Recently, however, the Corona Crisis, Brexit and restrictions on free movement of EU workers illustrate a series of serious backlashes against the fundamental markers of EU identity, and may point to the need for reflection on the European project (Zapata-Barrero 2017, p. 2; Triandafyllidou & Gropas 2015). The European identity of 'united in diversity' has been challenged by complex domestic and international developments, including (but not limited to) increased legal and illegal migration, globalization, expansion of the EU, the advent of Islamist movements in the Arab world, the EU's desire to play a global role, and the political engagement of a growing number of European Muslims (Aggestam & Hill 2008, p. 99). Recently, the measures that have been put in place by the EU and other European countries (e.g. internal travel restrictions and closure of the EU's external and

1 The use of the terms 'immigrant' and 'immigration' throughout this article is primarily referring to third-country nationals (TCNs) in relation to the EU, also including asylum seekers and refugees (see definition of TCNs in next footnote).

internal borders) to fight the Corona crisis can be added to the list of developments that challenge the unity of the EU.

Even though there have been significant advancements in creating a European identity based on diversity and multiculturality, as well as a European approach to immigration and integration based on some form of multiculturalism, in recent decades there has been a move among EU member states away from multiculturalist approaches towards policies that favour a new type of assimilation policies (civic integration policies) and security measures against immigrants from outside the EU (Carrera & Wiesbrock 2009, p. 3; Gozdecka et al. 2014, pp. 55–56). There is clearly an ambiguity in the EU as to whether the union is first and foremost the champion of diversity and multicultural integration policies, or if it actually has turned to assimilative oriented policies in the emerging modern form of civic integration policies (Aggestam & Hill 2008, pp. 99–105; Joppke 2007, p. 9; Wiesbrock 2009, p. 3).

The main purpose of this article is to explore whether there is any multiculturalism, i.e. parts of multicultural policies, in recent EU integration and immigration policy documents. Another purpose is to contribute to the understanding of the current EU immigration and integration policies in order to better comprehend their character and their impact on member states. The case study used is the EU Commission's Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals from 2016 (hereinafter: the Action Plan). The Action Plan is the latest policy document on integration of third country nationals (TCNs)[2] to be adopted by the Commission. It provides a broad framework to support Member States in their endeavour to develop and strengthen their integration policies. It also specifies concrete measures the Commission will implement in this regard. More specifically, this article will answer the following questions: 1) what types of policies and actions, which correspond to either the assimilative-oriented/civic integration system or the multicultural integration system, can be found in the Action Plan, and 2) does the Action Plan support the hypothesis that the EU has entered into a post-multiculturalism period characterized by an acknowledgment of group distinctions combined with the quest of social cohesion and building a national identity?

2 Definition according to the European Commission: Any person who is not a citizen of the European Union within the meaning of Art. 20(1) of TFEU and who is not a person enjoying the European Union right to free movement, as defined in Art. 2(5) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code).

1.1. EU policies towards immigration and integration of immigrants

We live in an age of migration. Modern developments such as globalization, new security threats, new technological achievements, and spread of cultures and ideas, are all interrelated with the global character of international migration in contemporary society. This global development is without precedence in our history; it affects most regions and countries, and links with other global processes, which changes our world (Castles Hein De Haas & Miller 2014). Moreover, the EU now faces several crises connected to globalization and the global character of migration, such as the global climate and sustainability crises, and the Covid-19 pandemic.

For the EU, the influx of immigrants after the Arab Spring and the continuing Syrian War has made immigration of TCNs (especially asylum seekers and refugees) affect notably borderline regions in the South and South East of Europe, i.e. main transport ways en route to main hubs of destination[3]. Secondary migratory routes have also been established that funnel immigrants to northern Europe.

Social and institutional constraints in the EU have limited the union's capacity to act on immigrant integration and immigration of TCNs, as the policy areas have largely not been harmonised at the EU level. Nonetheless, there have been important developments at the EU level and these advancements do increasingly have an essential role to play in understanding current immigration and integration policies within the EU (Boswell & Geddes 2011, p. 201). Thus, while EU member states try to deal with immigration and the integration of newcomers through different policy means, the EU dimension has gained in importance in forming policy answers to immigration and integration issues.

According to Aggestam and Hill (2008, p. 105) the reasons are:

1) *past failure to integrate immigrants adequately into host societies;*
2) *the rise of right-wing parties and extremism; and*
3) *the realization that the problem of migration will persist in a globalized world and that a collective EU policy is likely to have more effect than individual measures.*

The logic goes that the EU level simply provides member states with more options to address legal and political restrictions that they may face domestically (Aggestam & Hill, 2008, p. 105). Here, regarding the process of forming immigration and integration policies at EU level, further European integration can be seen as a 'rescue of the nation-state' in the words of Alan Milward (2000). Accordingly, Joppke (2007, pp. 1–2) holds that policy action at the EU level is gaining ground at the expense of the national level: "a key feature of the policy solutions that have been offered in response to the integration crisis is the weakening of

3 Examples of these regions include southern Spain, Greek islands in the Adriatic Sea and other Mediterranean islands such as Malta, Sicily, and Cyprus.

national distinctiveness, and a convergence with respect to the general direction and content of integration policy". Accordingly, even though there are a multitude – and expanding over the years because of the EU enlargement process – of member states' measures and policies towards immigration and integration of immigrants, there have evidently been some harmonizing effects due to the evolution of EU regulations and policies in relation to both migrants within the EU and TCNs (Aggestam & Hill 2008, p. 106).

In recent years the EU has defined new immigration and integration of TCNs in terms of crisis and emergency and has vividly connected immigration and integration issues to security issues (Gozdecka et al. 2014, pp. 53, 55–56). Especially in European countries, multicultural societies – and indeed multiculturalism – have been attributed to social security issues (Gozdecka et al. 2014, p. 55). Nationally, there has been a shift from equal treatment towards conditioned membership as national interpretations of immigrant integration. Similarly, in the EU, in line with the perception that immigrants are perceived as a threat to national values, there has been shift towards migration policies that guarantee social cohesion and put focus on social security issues (Carrera & Wiesbrock 2009, pp. 5–7; Gozdecka et al. 2014, p. 56; Kostakopoulou et al. 2009). The EU has moreover rearranged focus towards externalization of immigration policies. This externalization, in particular with regard to asylum seekers, can be categorized in three types; 1) shift of moral responsibility by putting blame on immigrants for their own misfortunes (socio-psychological externalization), 2) external projection of EU rules and immigration control policies to the southern neighbourhood and the eastern neighbourhood (political-legal externalization), and 3) shift of economic responsibility to take care of refugees and immigrants and their reintegration towards transit countries and countries of readmission/return (Faist 2018, pp. 10–22). These externalization processes have helped to create invisible barriers for incoming immigrants to Europe (Wolff 2017, pp. 379–380; Attinà 2016, pp. 21–22). The EU's process of externalization of immigration policies (and its connection to the emerging security narrative) is maybe best represented by the EU's response to the challenge of the increased immigration into Europe, the Commission's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) adopted in 2011. In the GAMM one can notice the preference of the EU Member States towards a development of short-term employment-oriented immigration policies that favour TCNs to work and stay temporarily in the union (Attinà 2016, pp. 21–22).

When referring to the situation of non-EU immigrants (especially asylum seekers) some even say that the EU has become a 'Fortress Europe' (Aggestam & Hill 2008, p. 106; Wolff 2017, p. 379). But why has the EU and its member states, some might say, become protectionists by shielding against immigration, and started to push for assimilative-oriented immigration integration polices? Should not the EU show global responsibility

and leadership in global immigration issues? It might be that some EU member states are not ready to become immigration societies, as the goals of immigration policies focusing on increasing immigrant numbers seem not yet to have been accepted by sizable parts of the European population (Enzensberger 1994, p. 136; van Krieken 2012, p. 516).[4]

Immigration and increasing ethnic diversity, as well as the perceived failure of certain state policies to secure integration of immigrants within EU member states, seems to drive a change of attitudes and mobilization of peoples (Boswell & Geddes 2011, p. 207). This mobilization brings about social and political movements, which are substantial forces behind securitized and assimilative-oriented immigration and integration policies at the EU level. This in turn fuels assimilative-oriented policies in the member states, and in the whole European security machinery. It seems as if the "securitization framework has penetrated most diversity-management thinking" in the EU (Zapata-Barrero 2017, p. 2).

Logically, the securitization of immigration and integration policies in the EU is counterproductive if the goal is to protect the multicultural Europe – not to mention multicultural policies – as it is hindering more open, cosmopolitan[5] and humanistic policies towards TCNs (Zapata-Barrero 2017, p. 2).

1.2. Multiculturalism and the return of assimilative policies in Europe

There is no commonly agreed understanding of what 'multiculturalism' means. First, it should be noted here that there is an important distinction to be made between multiculturalism and multiculturality. One can see multicultural societies as a reality of world history, of our cities and countries, rather than as an ideology. Both proponents and opponents of multiculturalism tend to miss the inbuilt contradiction between multiculturalism as an ideology and the multicultural reality of societies. Diversity exists in both terms, but with quite different meanings. Brian Barry's (2001) distinction between multiculturalism and multiculturality is very useful: multiculturalism is an ideology, a project often affiliated with nation-states and governance, and it is about the acceptance of group rights and diversity, while multiculturality means the actual reality and fact of cultural diversity, with many cultural groups understanding themselves as being separate from the nation-state and/or its majority culture (Aggestam & Hill 2008, p. 98). In this article, when referring to multiculturalism, I mean the ideology associated with governance of societies.

4 The explanation may lie in the fact that in some European countries it has been possible (until very recently) to argue that they have not 'really' been countries of immigration (in relation to classic immigration countries such as the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand characterized by heterogeneity) (van Krieken 2012, p. 516).

5 With regard to cosmopolitism and immigration, see Miller's (2016) principle of 'weak cosmopolitism' and how it can explain the EU's recent policies on and handling of refugees and asylum seekers.

Realising the social costs of war, Western societies developed multicultural approaches to immigrant integration over the decades following the First and Second World Wars (Alexander 2013, p. 532). For more than 30 years European countries stuck to policies that promoted tolerance and respect for cultural identities, especially of ethnic minorities and immigrants. These policies included measures such as support for community associations and cultural activities, strengthening positive images in the media, monitoring diversity in the workplace, and keeping a flexible public service system in order to accommodate culture-based differences (Vertovec 2018, p. 167).

However, since the end of the 1990's and during the 2000's there have been powerful national narratives containing theories and beliefs which have caused a wide and fundamental rollback of multiculturalism in Europe (Vertovec 2018). Both contemporary social debates and academic research have generated doubt about multicultural societies. Multiculturalism has, for instance, faced heavy criticism from interculturalists[6] that it, among other things, perceives cultural groups as fixed and living apart from each other (Simpson 2007; Bosetti et al. 2011; Brahm Levey 2019, p. 209).

The trend of discrediting multiculturalism has played into the emerging political focus on assimilation-oriented policies. There is a talk of a 'return to assimilation' (Brubaker 2001). This return of assimilation policies is closely connected to growing fears of alienation and radicalization of, and violence among, a minority of Europe's Muslim populations (Boswell & Geddes 2011, pp. 202, 205–206, 223).

Issues like the 'home-grown' element of international terrorism, the changing nature of global migration, the large influx of immigrants putting pressure on EU member states, new social formations across countries, the continuing poor socio-economic standing of immigrant and minority groups, and intense debates about the role of immigrants and the role of Islam in Europe, have created extensive critique against European models of multicultural integration. Domestic debates about multiculturalism have often rapidly become politicized and internationalized (Vertovec 2018, p 167; Aggestam & Hill 2008, p. 97).

Driven by the belief that previous policies failed, European nation-states' national civic integration policies have created a Europe-wide framework for comprehending policy problems and solutions to them (Boswell & Geddes 2011, p. 207). Hence, in later years, emerging national civic integration policies have become widely used in Europe. According to Zapata-Barrero (2017, p. 2) the national civic policy paradigm is a renovated (and often

6 Interculturalism is a contacts-based approach. It is seen as an anti-racist tool but can also be used as a type of integration policy. It focusses on greater dialogue and contact, understanding and respect between different cultures and groups with different backgrounds by removing factors which hinder contact zones. Interculturalism aims to foster communication and relations among people with different backgrounds and focus on common bonds rather than differences (Zapata-Barrero 2017, pp. 2–3, 7–8, 17).

more inclusive) popularized version of the assimilation paradigm. Civic integration policy has developed towards focusing on coercive integration practices. In European countries it is now commonplace, with civic integration policies that are more about duties and obligations than actual rights (Joppke 2007, p. 9; Zapata-Barrero 2017). According to Joppke (2007, p. 9) "the obligatory and coercive thrust of civic integration is moving to the fore almost everywhere".

Muslim immigration has generated a popular fear of the vulnerability and the potential degradation of the European civil sphere. Notably, since 9/11 a negative discourse, especially against Muslims and their physical places of expressing culture and religion, have played into the anti-multicultural sentiments. The negative discourse includes fear, hostility, discriminatory actions, violence, polluting sentiments, and aversion. In addition, extremist political parties have gained in popularity due to their anti-multicultural rhetoric. Multiculturalism has moreover been renounced by both intellectuals as well as political Left and political Right politicians, including conservatives and (quite surprisingly) also some liberals and socialists (Alexander 2013, pp. 542–546). European countries have therefore shifted away from embracing a multicultural model of integration of immigrants to assimilative integration practices. This change of policy has resulted in the enactment of restrictive laws, 'invisible' barriers, and tougher immigration and naturalization policies (Alexander 2013, p. 533, 542–546; Joppke 2007, pp. 7–8, 14; Vertovec 2018). Notably the introduction of citizenship tests or immigration tests, for instance in Britain and the Netherlands respectively, put in practice a changeover away from multicultural immigrant integration policies towards integration systems that focus on assimilation-like practices and civic integration policies, such as linguistic qualities and ('Liberal') socio-economic integration. Multicultural policies usually emphasized group-based rights and own-language teaching (Joppke 2007, pp. 7–8, 14; Boswell & Geddes 2011, p. 202, Vertovec 2018, pp. 174–175). The repressive dimension of civic integration is connected to liberalism/neoliberalism (Joppke 2007, p. 18). According to Joppke (2007, p. 14) "[c]ivic integration is an instance, next to eugenics and workfare policies, of 'illiberal social policy' in a liberal state". According to Desmond King (1999) and Joppke (2007, p. 16) such illiberal policies, which as we have seen in the case of civic integration policies focusing more on obligations and duties than rights, are not necessarily born out of nationalism or racism, but are built-in into Liberalism itself. Civic integration policies for immigrants reveal instead the existence of Liberalism of power and disciplining (Joppke 2007, p. 16).

While this is happening, it seems that the EU is becoming more multicultural in terms of presence and the share number of people from other cultures and countries outside the EU. As a fact, in many EU member states, undeterred by anti-multicultural public rhetoric, public opinion polls nonetheless display high levels of respect for diversity (Vertovec 2018,

p.176). Of course, the decades of strong presence of multiculturalism, the evolution of super-diversity and transnationalism (Vertovec 2018, pp. 173–176) have, in most European Western countries, led to a state where multiculturalism has been notably mainstreamed, "such that pluralistic provisions and some acceptance of the need to be culturally sensitive (ridiculed as 'political correctness') have become widespread and commonplace" (Vertovec 2018, p. 169).

There have also been observations that, despite the EU-wide backlash against multiculturalism, local authorities and major cities in the EU have continued to adapt to immigrant and minority differences, and diversity practices have been built into current institutions (Alexander 2013, pp. 534–535; Crul & Schneider 2010, p. 1257; Gebhardt 2016), for example in Britain (Meer & Modood 2009, pp. 479, 485). Moreover, there is a 'diversity buzz' in the business world, and there are agreements among unions, branches in the public sector and big companies to increase hiring of minorities (Alexander 2013, pp. 534–535; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010, p. 19).

2. Clarifying key concepts and analytical framework

When it comes to different forms of handling immigrants and their integration, the diversity of policy responses developed over time in Europe can be crystalized into three distinct models; 1) the assimilationist model, 2) the multicultural model, and 3) the guest worker model (Aggestam & Hill 2008, p. 103). The latter model is largely discredited nowadays as it is handling immigrants only as guest workers, and in its most refined state, is based on ethnic considerations in order to build monoculturalism. In Europe the model is not in use any longer, while it was associated for many years with Germany and Austria (Aggestam & Hill 2008, pp. 103–104). Because this model is not in use in the EU today, I will not use it my analytical framework.

I will define and explain the assimilative-oriented/civic integration system and the multicultural integration system, which will form the base of the analytical tool on which the content analysis of the Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals will be dependent. Definitions and concepts will be drawn from analytical research about distinctions between the assimilation-/national civic integration model and the multicultural integration model, and about policies of multiculturalism and national civic integration polices (e.g. Joppke 2007; Zapata-Berrero 2017; Vertovec 2018; Aggestam & Hill 2008).

The multicultural integration system celebrates diversity and sees it as a permanent rather than a short-lived phenomenon. It promotes civic unity only if at the same time it is possible that the quest for unity accommodates and recognizes the multicultural diversity of society, and it does so by granting rights (besides to individuals) collectively

to important cultural and religious groups in the society (Aggestam & Hill 2008, pp. 103–104). It promotes equality, power sharing and inclusion while still recognizing differences among specific groups as it seeks to represent, maintain and reflect the cultural identities of groups of immigrants and minorities by virtue of the intrinsic value of their cultures (Zapata-Berrero 2017, p. 2; Boswell & Geddes 2011, p. 207). For instance, it is in line with the multicultural approach to provide opportunities for representation in local and national government bodies for minority groups based on culture and ethnicity, or to restructure public institutions towards service production that incorporates pluralism and accommodate them to different groups' cultures and traditions, or to ensure the continuity of minorities and immigrants by recognizing and supporting their distinctive religions, traditions, cultural practices and languages (Vertovec 2018, p. 168; Joppke 2007, pp. 5–14; Zapata-Berrero 2017, pp. 3–7).

The assimilative-oriented/civic integration system is, on the other hand, representative of a universalist nationalism. It adheres to social cohesion (that is, order, not justice) and perceives that the nation, people and culture are an integral whole, and as such it expects solidarity and that immigrants and minority groups are to be incorporated into the dominant culture of society (Aggestam & Hill 2008, pp. 103–104). Thus, it is also about mainstreaming integration politics[7], moving away from specific integration policies (Simon & Beaujeu 2018, p. 41). Following the same logic, it also highlights individual responsibility in immigrants' integration – "their adaptation to the host society is perceived as a one-sided effort" (van Breugel & Scholten 2018, p. 131). It is thus the responsibility of immigrants and minorities to demonstrate desire to belong to the nation-state and learn about its history, norms and institutions and adopt its cultural practices and values. It is in line with the assimilative-oriented/civic integration approach to focus on measures that support necessitated social inclusion[8], conformity, national identity and dominant cultural values, and on obligations and duties (sometimes placing them as a condition for the grant of rights) – for example by locking down low-skilled immigrants[9] more firmly into established state borders, or by applying harshened language requirements (normally through compulsory courses and tests) so that immigrants acquire a certain standard or level of competency in official language(s) in order to integrate in the society or get citizenship (Vertovec 2018, p. 174; Zapata-Berrero 2017, pp. 5–7; Joppke 2007, pp. 5–14, 17–18).

7 'Mainstreaming integration politics' in this context does not mean an enlargement of the interest in immigrants or minorities, but rather an attempt to get away from group-based actions which create resentment in the majority population (see Simon & Beaujeu 2018, p. 41).

8 In this context the main purpose of social inclusion is social cohesion. It includes obligation-imposing elements, and sometimes requires people to become included.

9 Locking down low-skilled immigrants connects to externalisation of integration politics and to the EU's overall external and security politics.

It is uncommon to find any of the two above systems fully refined in a nation-state. However, states can (and often do) show an ambiguity, or maybe sometimes a clear consciousness, about combining several elements of more than one model into their own state-led immigrant integration systems. So, the difference in integration and immigration policies between member states in the EU can be quite stark.

Vertovec (2018, pp. 170–175) holds that that state-led immigration and integration policies in Europe have entered into a post-multiculturalist period. Multiculturalism has been disregarded and heavily criticized across the political spectrum and across countries because of the rise of 'transnationalism' (i.e. migrants' increasing cross-border technology-driven links to their homeland or to their kin in other parts of the world), as well as the rise of 'super-diversity' (meaning the growing size and complexity of migration and mobility, distinguished by a dynamic interplay of factors including migrants' country of origin, type of migration channel, and their legal status). The post-multiculturalist period is characterized by a nation-state where acknowledgment of group distinctions is combined with the quest of building a national identity and a system where laws and government policies affect every group in the society the same (irrespectively of ethnicity, cultural background etc.). In the words of Vertovec (2018, p. 175) "[p]ost-multiculturalist policies and discourse seek to have it both ways: a strong common identity and values coupled with the recognition of cultural differences (alongside differences based on gender, sexuality, age and disability)". There is a search in several European countries for integration policies that combine the political Right (curbing new immigration as it is understood as disruptive to society, decreasing competing values and promoting national identity) and the political Left (fostering social capital, supporting diversity, and reducing socioeconomic inequality) (Vertovec 2018, p. 175).

The present case study will use content analysis[10] in analysing the EU Commission's Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals. Hence, it is possible to explore the use of key words and sentences that correspond to either the assimilative-oriented/ civic integration system or the multicultural integration system in order to find out whether the former European Commission's policies on immigration and integration rest heavily on the former or the latter mode of integration, or if it is an even game between the two. Through the content analysis of the Action Plan I will also find out whether there is support to Steven Vertovec's (2018) argument that the EU is in a distinct post-multiculturalism

10 During the coding I have placed the relevant codes under a set of created sub-categories which I judged to represent these codes of interest. The sub-categories are thus meant to group the codes representing different types of meaning associated with the two specific integration systems. I have also extracted codes which relate more clearly to a couple of other concepts or themes, i.e. not specifically connected either of the two integration systems. Those categories include a) intercultural dialogue, b) economic instrumentalism, and c) problem formulation and background. The reader can get the coding and categorization scheme from the researcher.

period and if this is true in the Commission's recent policies on integration of immigrants. I will explore the document's text openly and find explanations in the central codes and categories, which are to be investigated in the document based on the research questions and my conceptual and theoretical framework. Before the result and analysis section, I will however make a short summary of the Action Plan.

The European Commission adopted the Action Plan in June 2016. The Action Plan provides an all-covering policy document to support Member States' efforts in developing and strengthening their integration policies. Furthermore, it describes the concrete actions the Commission will implement. While it targets all TCNs in the EU, it also contains actions to address the specific challenges faced by refugees.

Summarized, the Action Plan provides measures in the following policy areas:

- Pre-departure and pre-arrival measures, including actions to prepare migrants and the local communities for the integration process
- Education, including actions to promote language training, participation of migrant children to early childhood education and care, teacher training and civic education
- Employment and vocational training, including actions to promote early integration into the labour market and migrants' entrepreneurship
- Access to basic services such as housing and healthcare
- Active participation and social inclusion, including actions to support exchanges with the receiving society, migrants' participation to cultural life, and fighting discrimination

The Action Plan also provides tools to strengthen coordination between the different actors working on integration at local, regional and national levels.

3. Summarization and analysis of the findings

Below, a condensed presentation of the result of the content analysis of the Action Plan is provided. It maps out the created sub-categories (based on the codes found) relating to either the assimilative-oriented/civic integration system or the multicultural integration system.

A) The multicultural integration system	**B) The assimilative-oriented/civic integration system**
A1) Rights and freedoms for TCNs, as well as promoting anti-discrimination, equality and power sharing. **A2)** Measures targeting the receiving society/majority culture trying to counteract anti-inclusive tendencies. **A3)** Celebrating and recognizing cultural diversity in the society. **A4)** Unconstrained support to participate in the society and promoting equality, power sharing and, inclusion, while still recognizing diversity in the society. **A5)** Recognition of TCN competencies and skills as equal to citizens' competencies and skills. **A6)** Promoting civic unity only if at the same time it is possible that the quest for unity accommodates and recognizes the multicultural diversity of society. **A7)** Group-based support and measures and positive discrimination.	**B1)** Cohesion of society of fundamental importance. **B2)** Responsibilities and duties; fostering national identity, creating a sense of belonging to the nation-state and loyal subjects; understanding and mastering language, culture, traditions and values. **B3)** Mainstreaming integration policies. **B4)** Externalisation of immigration and integration policies. **B5)** Education, childhood education and care, training, assessment and sport as social inclusion. **B6)** Health issues and isolation obstacles to social inclusion.

According to the result the above types (constructed categories) of policies and actions, that correspond to either the assimilative-oriented/civic integration system or the multicultural integration system, can be found in the Commission's Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals.

The Action Plan, moreover, acknowledges the 'super-diversity' (see p. 9) of the immigration of the TCNs as it highlights the increasing share of non-EU nationals residing in the EU and that "European societies are, and will continue to become, increasingly diverse" (European Commission 2016, p. 2), as well as highlighting factors in relation to integration such as that "individual integration needs vary widely depending on the person's reason for coming to the EU, the expected length of stay as well as their skills, level of education and working experiences" (European Commission 2016, p. 4). It also, to some degree, acknowledges, the 'transnationalism' of the non-EU immigrants as it includes diasporas and migrant communities in non-governmental stakeholders that should be involved in forming immigrant integration policies (European Commission 2016, p. 14).

The content analysis of the Action Plan shows evenly matched representations of both multicultural and assimilative-oriented/civic integration policies and actions. Additionally, representations of the intercultural policy paradigm and a heavy focus on economic instrumentalism and employment in integration policies were found. These findings support the argument that the Action Plan is an example of how the EU has entered into a post-multiculturalism period in line with Vertovec's (2018) and others' (e.g. Joppke 2007) understanding of the development of TCN integration policies in the EU. The conclusion is that the EU promotes immigration and integration policies that adhere to the post-multiculturalist notion. The policies are characterized by a complex blend of different political positions from both the Right and the Left on the political spectrum, as well as of both multicultural and assimilative-oriented/civic integration policies, where the former protects diversity while the latter defends unity. Different paradigms seem to exist side by side and contradict each other, which can lead to confusion, but in line with what Simon & Beaujeu (2018) have concluded with regard to the philosophies of integration and policy designs in France, the UK and the Netherlands: "[w]hat could be seen as a plurality of paradigms is actually a struggle between forces that try to impose their own agenda to multicultural societies" (Simon & Beaujeu 2018, p. 40).

Joppke (2007) illustrates this policy convergence and post-multiculturalist development in the EU by noting that the European Council agreement on common basic principles of immigrant integration policy from 2004 has a reduced emphasis on cultural recognition, as earlier programmatic statements by EU member states "were much louder in affirming the integrity of [im]migrant cultures and ways of life", and this "points to an important reorientation of European states' immigrant integration policies" (Joppke 2007, p. 4).

The document instead formulates an inclusiveness that represents a distinct 'two-way' integration approach meaning that "integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the Member States" (Council of the European Union 2004, p. 19). Interestingly, the document lacks commitment and obligation from EU member states to advance and protect immigrant (or minority) languages and cultures, hence the member state does not become active in their maintenance or protection. At the same time there is a heavy focus on equality and non-discrimination, which corresponds to the proliferation of anti-discrimination laws and policies in the EU that reflects Europe's structural transformation into a multi-ethnic society (Joppke 2007, pp. 4–5).

It can be noted that at the EU level – in contrast to the national level – there is a certain twist to the whole spectrum of immigration and integration policies as the EU is obliged to embrace the fundamental principles and the rights framework that underpins the whole construction of the union. As a result, "the spatial relocation to the EU level does create a distinct setting with its own forms of legal, social and political power; but, equally, the EU setting cannot be detached from national developments" (Boswell & Geddes 2011, pp. 207–208).

Results from the content analysis also show a connection to two categories other than the assimilative-oriented/civic integration system or the multicultural integration system. These other categories are the economic instrumentalism category, and the intercultural policy paradigm category. Considering these categories helped answer the question of whether the Action Plan supports the hypothesis that the EU has entered into a post-multiculturalism period.

Economics in immigration is important, not the least at the EU level. Castles Hein De Haas & Miller (2014) show that economic immigration is vital for advanced economies, as immigration often has positive impacts on low birth-rates and on the economic growth as it, for instance, solves worker shortages. As expected, the Action Plan contained a significant portion of economic instrumentalism. Considering that economic immigration is of fundamental importance to advanced economies it comes as no surprise that this aspect is integrated into integration strategies and policies. In the Action Plan there is a focus, for example, on early (fast track) integration into and participation in the labour market for newly arrived TCNs (especially vulnerable groups such as women and youths), on building socio-economically thriving societies, and on the well-being and prosperity of European societies connected to immigration and their integration. In the Action Plan it is communicated that the failure to release the potential of TCNs would represent a massive waste of resources. The centrality of employment in Europe's contemporary immigrant integration policies can also clearly be observed in earlier Commission documents, such as

the Commission's first Annual Report on Migration and Integration (European Commission 2004), the EU's earlier European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals 2011–2015 (European Commission 2011), as well as in the European Council agreement on 'common basic principles' of immigrant integration policy from 2004 (Council of the European Union 2004).

Socioeconomic integration is a focal point of EU member states' immigrant integration policies. The economic instrumentalism and the need to get everyone in the society into the labour market as quickly as possible has to do with the contemporary trend of European states focusing on the flexible individual and her 'autonomy' and 'self-sufficiency' (providing incomes for the state), as well as with the EU's global competition goals. Non-state dependent individuals increase the competitiveness of member states and of the EU as a whole (Faist 2017, p. 29; Joppke 2007, pp. 4, 16–17). So, in order to "allow a full utilisation of society's resources in the global competition" the EU ties everything from anti-discrimination regulations and policies to immigrant integration and social inclusion policies with labour market integration (Joppke 2007, p. 16–17). Moreover, the economic efficiency of immigration into the EU and how this is tied to the global competition goals is of great significance in the Commission's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (Attinà 2016, p. 21–22). According to Joppke (2017, p. 17) this economic instrumentalism and the focus on employment in social inclusion policies cannot be connected to traditional assimilationist and cultural homogenisation, however "there is still a 'perfectionist' dimension to it, and one with paternalist, obligation-imposing possibilities, in the sense that being in 'work' is not just a means for an income, but is seen as of intrinsic importance to an individual's well-being, and thus to be pursued, or imposed, for its own sake". Joppke (2017, p. 17) concludes that the "main purpose of social inclusion is social cohesion, that is, order, not justice". In line with this reasoning one could connect economic instrumentalism and the focus on employment in integration policies with the civic integration system. However, in the document analysis I opted to separate economic and employment aspects from the assimilative-oriented/civic integration system category, as it is unclear in the literature on the civic integration paradigm whether there is an obvious connection.

Another quite recurrent theme (if not as prominent as the other three themes) in the Action Plan is the promotion of intercultural dialogue between TCNs and the host society. It includes actions such as promotion of TCNs' participation in early childhood education and care in order to learn to "live together in heterogeneous societies" (pp. 7–8), "involvement of TCNs themselves in the design and implementation of integration policies" (p. 12), "sustaining real people-to-people contacts through social, cultural and sports activities and even political engagement" (p. 12), as well as creating links and exchanges between TCNs and host societies "through volunteering, sport and culture activities from the very

beginning" (p. 13) in order to facilitate the cohesion of the society and dialogue and mutual understanding (European Commission 2016).

This theme corresponds to the intercultural policy paradigm (interculturalism) put forward by Ricard Zapata-Barrero (2017, 2013, 2015) and others (see Wood 2009, Bouchard 2011), often cited as a response to a post-multiculturalist Europe and a response the complexities raised by superdiversity (van Breugel & Scholten 2018). Importantly, interculturalism is seen as a middle ground between the multiculturalism paradigm and the national civic policy paradigm, as it holds "diversity as an advantage and a resource while its main normative policy drivers are community cohesion and a diversity-based common public culture" (Zapata-Barrero 2017, p. 3).

4. Discussion – arguing for a return of multiculturalism in the EU

Policy reactions to multiculturality and handling minorities vary greatly between EU member states, as they are associated to specific national concepts of citizenship and experiences of state-building (Aggestam & Hill 2008, p. 103).

There is a significant amount of scientific research on the development of civic integration policies and their illiberal and/or assimilationist character in relation to immigrants (Gebhardt 2016, p. 743). It has been argued by many that sociocultural factors, that are understood as paramount to the civic integration policies, play an ever-increasing role in understanding the perceived problems (and the solutions to them) of integration of immigrants. Ruud Koopmans (2016, p. 213), for instance, argues that the sociocultural factors of language proficiency, social capital and gender values explain labour market gaps between natives and immigrants.

It could, however, be argued that such a focus on social cultural factors with regard to integration is only reinforcing the stigma of immigrants as something alien to the society that needs to be forced into employment and educated in the ways of our culture. When immigrants and minorities try to become part of the host country's civil society it is well understood that immigrants' incorporation through assimilation-oriented (including civic integration) policies is only making the 'outsiders' more unfamiliar, and reinforces prejudices of immigrant groups in the society, since assimilation is only allowing persons, but not their qualities, to be incorporated (Alexander 2013, pp. 534, 547). When stigmatized immigrants try to jump from the economic into the civil sphere, the empirical instabilities of assimilative incorporation have been quite clearly displayed in earlier research (Alexander 2013, p. 547). There are thus question marks that speaks against the logic behind the fruitfulness of assimilation policies.

Taking into account factors such as the reality of societies' multiculturality, the plight and shrinking numbers of many minority cultures and languages in Europe (and the world), as well as the sheer number of immigrants in most of our urban societies, I argue that the EU should strive for reversing the assimilation-oriented policies in Europe. The EU should promote and reinvest in heterogeneity, the dispersion of cultures, and in minority culture language, practices and traditions. This is because not only TCNs gain from such policies, but also national historical minorities who find it difficult to safeguard the survival of their cultures and traditions, such as the hundreds of national ethnic and linguistic minority groups that exist in Europe.

I argue that there is gap – both in much of the literature on integration policies and in the Commission's recent policies on the integration of TCNs – in altruism and in taking into consideration more seriously the human rights of TCNs, and Europe's common responsibility to respond the global inequalities that the EU is actively fuelling and to embrace more fully the increasingly multicultural (i.e. the multiculturality of) European societies. As the EU and its member states, for instance, are facilitating fishing contracts (that intensify poverty and immigration to the EU) and are allying with warring sides in deadly conflicts in northern African and Middle Eastern countries, both EU member states and the union itself have the responsibility to acknowledge their part in the current global order and the historical and economical injustices. The EU has instead, on the contrary, concentrated on externalization of immigration and integration policies, in particular with regard to asylum seekers, by: 1) shifting moral responsibility by putting blame on immigrants for their own misfortunes, 2) external projection of EU rules and immigration control policies to the southern neighbourhood and the eastern neighbourhood, and 3) by shifting economic responsibility to take care of refugees and immigrants and their reintegration towards transit countries and countries of readmission/return (Faist 2018, pp. 10–22).

One way to find the right scope of policy actions would be a modern form of multiculturalism. Here the Bristol school of multiculturalism (BSM) could be of interest to forthcoming EU integration policies (Brahm Levey 2019). BSM takes the legitimacy of multiculturalism from the situation of the multiculturality of societies where people from different backgrounds "seek recognition and inclusion in their societies as they are and for what they are" (Brahm Levey 2019, p. 205). The BSM holds that multiculturalism (besides fighting discrimination and xenophobia etc.) must take "minorities' 'positive difference' seriously by fashioning more inclusive policies and services, restructuring institutions and broadening the national story" (Brahm Levey 2019, p. 206). A set of essential principles guide the BSM: 1) equality (reject interpretations of equal treatment that ignore differences in people's background circumstances), 2) along with ethnic and cultural groups and identities multiculturalism should also include religious groups and

identity, 3) intercommunal dialogue, and 4) the importance of a sense of belonging in one's society (the notion of 'civic multicultural national identity' where national identity is perceived as being a collective work in progress) (Brahm Levey 2019, pp. 207–215). In short, the BSM can be explained as a "distinctive in multicultural political thought" that is "[f]undamentally critical of liberal doctrine and highly assertive of cultural minorities' identities and right to belong", while it "is also accepting of liberal operative public values and supportive of a remade national identity" (Brahm Levey 2019, pp. 219–220).

5. Concluding remarks

While bearing in mind present-day differences in socio-economic conditions and politics of belonging, it is interesting to take note of history. Societies characterized by multiculturality do prosper if managed inclusively. Examples include the city of Cordoba in southern Spain during the Muslim reign, Constantinople during the Byzantine period, or Baku in ancient times, just to mention a few. Multicultural societies, states, and empires have existed for millennia. However, how societies have adapted to multicultural realities has shifted across time and space. In the past and present we can see examples of societies celebrating diversity and emphasizing multiple identities in forming their social culture, and we should recognize the advantages of societies that are integrated while still holding on to their different ethnic and cultural identities.

As a conclusion, in the past and present we know that multicultural societies have benefited from a celebration of multiculturality, and have benefited from a multicultural-sensitive set-up of their societies and their governance structures. We can here use the words of Jeffrey Alexander (2013, p. 547): "[o]nly by making itself multicultural can Europe preserve its democratic values in the globalizing world that it confronts today". In relation to recent political development in the EU, a question arises here about the decision to assign the newly appointed EU vice president of the European Commission with the task/title of 'promoting the European way of life'. Such a title seems to go in the opposite direction of the EU motto, ´United in Diversity`, and the multicultural Europe. It is clear that further research is needed on this issue.

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Swedish-American Relations and the Vietnam War, 1965–1975

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Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies,
4(2) 2020, 116–148

URL: http://jass.ax/volume-4-issue-2-Habtom/

Abstract

Between 1965-1975, Sweden and the United States experienced a worsening diplomatic relation-ship as a result of domestic pressures caused by the Vietnam War. In Sweden, this came initially in the form of grassroots activism, which spread into the electoral base of the governing Social Dem-ocratic Party, whose leadership feared losing voters to the Communist Party. Simultaneously, the government of the United States sought to combat any criticism towards its campaign while at the same time not alienating an otherwise strategic partner. The massive fluctuation in diplomatic relations was further complicated by a wide array of issues, ranging from American deserters to Swedish mediation efforts and attempts at freeing American prisoners of war. Notably, military and intelligence cooperation during this period remained strong and largely unaffected. This episode offers many lessons on Cold War neutrality and attempts by small states to forge an independent foreign policy while seeking to maintain relations.

Keywords

Cold War, Vietnam War, Swedish-American Relations

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Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Dr. Bill Foster of Homerton College, University of Cambridge for supervising me on this research project from beginning to end and for his invaluable input. Additionally, I greatly benefitted from the feedback from the reviewers, which helped me convert this project into a jour-nal article.

1. Introduction

Friendly relations between Sweden and the United States date back to the days of the American War of Independence when the two countries signed the 1783 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, which proclaimed that '[t]here shall be a firm, inviolable and universal peace and a true and sincere friendship between the King of Sweden, his heirs and successors, and the United States of America.'[1] Peace between the two countries has advanced uninterrupted to the present day. The favourable attitude held by the United States towards the Swedes was continuously reaffirmed indirectly, such as through the privileged status that the citizens of the Nordic kingdom had vis-à-vis US immigration law.[2] In the over 200 years of formal relations, only the period commencing in 1965 and concluding in 1975 can be described as an aberration of the otherwise positive bonds between the two nations.

The deterioration of good relations is heavily intertwined with the two respective nations' attitudes and engagement in the Vietnam War. However, the events that transpired in Southeast Asia were, in a way, secondary in regards to the development of Swedish foreign policy and rhetoric, as well as American responses to it. It shall be argued here that Sweden's condemnation of American actions was triggered by the latter's conduct in Vietnam as a direct cause, though that it was primarily albeit indirectly a response to increasing domestic political pressure.

This piece will examine in detail how the two parties, in many respects, were speaking past one another in responding to increasingly growing internal tensions, with the consequent results being a deterioration in bilateral ties that was both undesired and unintentional on both sides. At its core lies the question 'Why?', with neighbouring Denmark and Norway, having joined NATO following the failure to establish a Scandinavian Defence Union,[3] pursuing a more amicable relationship despite latent US-critical attitudes being prevalent amongst the general population.[4] In addition, this work seeks to examine the decoupling between diplomatic and military relations between Sweden and the United States.

Involved in this process is a whole cast of actors, ranging from elected politicians to local activists to diplomats, among many others with their origins spanning three continents. A key segment among these is the then-governing Social Democratic Party, a left-wing party that had governed continuously for decades and was foundational in molding and creating

1 'Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States and Sweden' (3 April 1783) http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field(DOCID+@lit(bdsdcc08701))
2 Mae M. Ngai, 'The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924,' The Journal of American History, Vol. 86, No. 1 (Jun., 1999), p. 74
3 Nils Örvik and Niels J. Haagerup, 'The Scandinavian Members of Nato,' The Institute for Strategic Studies, Number 23, December 1965, p. 1.
4 Ibid., p. 12.

numerous elements that continue to mark Sweden to this day, including the modern welfare state and reinforcing the country's policy of neutrality. Despite having been the hegemonic power in Swedish politics, they were by no means alone, with parties such as the agrarian, non-socialist opposition party *Centerpartiet* (the Centre Party) and the pro-United States *Moderaterna* (the Conservatives),[5] as well as the more the radical Communists and the multiple extra-parliamentary Maoist organisations.

In this work, the relationship between the two nations during the Vietnam War will be divided into four sections, each examining a specific theme. The first section deals with why Sweden chose to involve itself in a conflict from which it was so far removed, as well as the domestic causes for this. Unlike during the earlier French war in Indochina, the Social Democrats began to fear electoral losses at the hands of the Communists due to their silence on the issue of Vietnam. The section looks at the process of radicalisation in Sweden around the conflict, both on the governmental as well as grassroots level, and tracks this development. In particular, the style and substance of the rhetoric of the Swedish government is analysed to demonstrate that in order to placate a domestic electoral base, leading officials increasingly directed their criticism at the United States government.

The second section looks at the American response to growing Swedish chastisement and how this further impacted relations between the two states. By contrasting the official statements of the United States government with its actions, a pattern can be identified as consisting of repeated threats of various kinds, most notably economically, only to be followed up on by a cooling of diplomatic relations. Such a pattern holds true both during the presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson as well as that of Richard Nixon, which suggests that the causes for this were not based so much on the personalities or ideologies but on the more fundamental relationship between the two countries and the inherent predicaments in which they both found themselves.

The third section examines the continued successful cooperation that existed despite the growing hostility between the White House and the Government of Sweden. In this section, a distinction is made between the political/diplomatic disagreements on the one hand and the continued covert military and intelligence collaboration that persisted despite the overt clashes between the two nations. The close ties in regards to armament and intelligence sharing illustrate that the strategic aims of the two countries did not divert significantly enough to cause any serious damage to the practical dimension of bilateral relations.

The fourth section broadens the scope of Swedish foreign policy and what role Vietnam, and consequently the United States, played within the Cold War and how it mirrored and

5 NB The name literally translates to 'the Moderates' though contemporary translations tended to use the term 'the Conservatives.'

yet differed from other Cold War hotspots. What made Vietnam the subject of Swedish attention was ultimately its remoteness, which in turn offered the Nordic country significant freedom of action that may not have been possible along the Iron Curtain. By surveying the postcolonial landscape, Vietnam ceases to stand as an isolated case, except for its impact on Swedish-American ties, and one can begin to see that it falls within a consistent framework that extends beyond Southeast Asia to Southern Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean and elsewhere.

While the fighting in Vietnam has been covered extensively, the diplomatic impact of this has not been explored to the same, or even to a satisfactory, extent. Understanding the indirect effects of the war, in particular as it relates to an asymmetrical relationship such as the one between Sweden and the United States, is vital if one wishes to appreciate more fully the legacy of the War in Vietnam on the rest of the world. This is particularly true in the case of military relations, whereby a small and formally neutral state exists under two simultaneous pressures consisting of the political-diplomatic on the one hand, while maintaining a seemingly contradictory military relationship that was internally perceived as necessary.

Many of the sources obtained from the Military Archives of Sweden were only recently declassified, and include an array of vital documentations and origins and illustrate the divergence between diplomatic and military relations. Among these are documents from the Swedish Embassy in Washington D.C., the Pentagon, the Swedish Defence Staff, and research institutions. These are varied in nature, ranging from personal correspondence between key military officials from both the United States and Sweden to technical assessments and intelligence observations. The uniqueness of these sources is significant due to their unavailability in English (and until recently in Swedish as well) in addition to their frank reflections, something that is missing in memoirs, which are distorted by the benefit of hindsight and are almost entirely written by diplomats and civilians and not military officers. By analysing many of these original sources for the first time, a clearer picture can be formed on the basis of contemporary attitudes, which is not otherwise possible. Some of these aspects have been explored to varying degrees, such as in Ann-Marie Ekengren's *Olof Palme och utrikespolitiken: Europa och tredje världen* ('Olof Palme and foreign policy: Europe and the Third World') or Ulf Bjereld's, Alf Johansson's and Karl Molin's *Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred: svensk utrikespolitik under kalla kriget* ('Sweden's security and world peace: Swedish foreign policy during the Cold War'), though they have not been singularly focused on the impact of the Vietnam War on Sweden's bilateral relationship with the United States. Furthermore, these works and others, like Mikael Holmström's book *Den dolda alliansen: Sveriges hemliga NATO-förbindelser* ('Hidden alliance: Sweden's secret ties to NATO'), have been almost entirely

confined to Swedish language literature, with few of these works, with the sole exception of military-focused research like Mikael Nilsson's *Tools of Hegemony: Military Technology and Swedish-American Security Relations, 1945–1962,* having entered English language research before.

The first two sections, though previously covered by the likes of Carl-Gustaf Scott and Fredrik Logevall, in and of themselves stop short from fully unveiling the isolation in which bilateral military relations existed and even flourished in. By introducing the sources covered in the third section, the bizarreness of the US-Swedish relationship, in its fullest sense, becomes evident beyond the initial breakdown in amity. The ultimate purpose of this work is twofold: review the existing literature, and simultaneously examine the discrepancy between Sweden's overt and covert conduct in the context of the Vietnam War, namely in the form of increased and strengthened military cooperation.

2. Development of Sweden's Vietnam Policy

Post-WWII American involvement in Southeast Asia dates back to the First Indochina War, which began under Truman, continuing past the Eisenhower Administration into the Kennedy and later Johnson periods. Despite the long prior history of American involvement in the region, Swedish opposition to it manifested itself earlier than American mass opposition to the war. While some public protests had taken place during the latter half of 1964, it was not until February 1965 that they had become regular, with small weekly vigils being held in front of the US Embassy in Stockholm.[6] Despite the regularity of the vigils, they did not initially generate a lot of attention. This changed on 14 June 1965 when several anti-war protestors were ill-treated by police, immediately resulting in media focus, with *Aftonbladet* and *Stockholms Tidningen* (Social Democratic newspapers)[7] and *Dagens Nyheter* (a Liberal Party-leaning newspaper) writing sympathetically of the protests.[8] Until this point, the Swedish media had been rather mute on the conflict, with most of the coverage of Southeast Asia initially having been confined to cultural or editorial pages of newspapers.

Visible among the early demonstrators were not senior Social Democratic Party figures, but rather members of *Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Studentförbund* (Sweden's Social Democratic Student Association).[9] While the Swedish left was unanimously opposed to US involvement in Vietnam, it was still divided into two factions: those who advocated

6 Erik Tängerstad, 'Att organisera ett engagemang,' University of Stockholm, 1988, p. 19, 30.
7 For examples, see Stockholms-Tidningen 16 June 1965 and Aftonbladet 17 June 1965.
8 Dagens Nyheter 21 July 1965 and 29 January 1966.
9 Carl-Gustaf Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, Stockholm: Elanders, 2017 p. 51.

peace and those who advocated continued Vietnamese armed struggle. The latter group, to a significant extent, consisted of Maoists who were particularly vocal in their opposition to the government's inaction. Increasingly, there was a fear that if the Social Democrats fell behind on the Vietnam question, it could be seized upon by the Communists, the Liberals, or even a new socialist party. This concern was even publicly written about by the Social Democratic monthly periodical *Tiden* as early as June 1965.[10]

The first high profile critique of the Vietnam War was made by Olof Palme, a minister without portfolio at the time, on 30 July 1965. Palme spoke at a gathering of *Sveriges Kristna Socialdemokraters Förbund* (Sweden's Christian Social Democrats' Association) in the city of Gävle. While he refrained from explicitly condemning the United States, he went further than any previous Social Democratic politician of his stature in claiming that it was 'an illusion to believe that demands for social justice can be put down by military force.'[11] By contrast, Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson's earlier comments on this topic had done little more than express hope for a speedy resolution to the conflict. The fact that Palme was first to make such a declaration, as opposed to the Prime Minister, is understandable, since the Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, though supportive of the sentiments expressed in Palme's comment, was hesitant to openly risk Swedish-American relations. This can be seen in the Cabinet's quick apology to the Johnson Administration for the burning of an American flag at a May Day demonstration.[12] Similarly, Erlander responded to the news that anti-war protesters had vandalised the American Embassy in January 1967 by stating that he was embarrassed that such a thing could have come to pass, and reiterated his certainty that the whole of Sweden was similarly ashamed about this incident.[13] While it is easy to understand Palme's critique as being directed towards the United States, the principle audience was the far left, as Palme privately confessed to Lennart Petri, the Swedish Ambassador to Beijing.[14]

At the forefront of the anti-war movement were left-wing radicals, particularly Maoists and the Communists. Even in the lead up to the 1966 municipal elections, the Swedish Communist Party emphasised its position on issues relating to the Third World and national liberation movements. Even American officials predicted that these efforts by the Communists would push the Social Democrats to the left on the question of Vietnam.[15] This left-wing pressure on the municipal and parliamentary level was mirrored by the creation

10 Ibid., p. 52.
11 'Det är en illusion att tro att man kan möta krav på social rättvisa med våld och militära maktmedel' Palme as cited in UD, Utrikesfrågor 1965 (Stockholm: UD, 1965) pp.42–47.
12 Dagens Nyheter 2 May 1966.
13 Erlander in Svenska Dagbladet 29 January 1967.
14 Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, p. 54.
15 27 Aug. 1966. J. Graham Parsons. Telegram to State. Subject Numeric Files 1964–1966. Political and Defense. Sweden.

of *Arbetsgruppen för stöd åt FNL* (Working Groups for the Support of FNL, commonly referred to as FNL-Groups) in September 1965, which would become very prominent at demonstrations, though less so elsewhere.[16] Physical presence of anti-war sentiments grew increasingly visible. FNL-Groups, with chapters across Sweden, managed to organise biennial 'Vietnam Weeks' that were each made up of a whole week of everything from anti-war photo exhibitions, teach-ins, theatre productions, etc., which were concluded with a large rally. The first of these weeks, which occurred in March 1966, took place in 12 different locales with 26 different demonstrations, with the event in Stockholm featuring the largest anti-war demonstration Sweden had seen since WWII.[17]

Left-wing radicalism became increasingly defined by its critical stance vis-à-vis the United States, and consistently stood to the left of the government itself. To some degree, this became a mark of pride. For example, after US Ambassador Jerome Holland was hit with eggs in 1970 by FNL sympathisers, both Palme and Nilsson were swift to come out and call the agitators *'lymlar'* ('rascals') in parliamentary debates. The phraseology would quickly be co-opted with the term *'lymmel'* (singular form) becoming a badge of honour, to the extent that the FNL group in Örebro even named its newspaper *'Lymmeln'* ('The Rascal').[18]

It is necessary to identify what trends caused Swedish criticism of the United States (and to a lesser degree South Vietnam). The most identifiable is US conduct in Southeast Asia, which is to say that Swedish critique was tied directly to the intensity of US fighting. This was particularly true regarding massive bombing campaigns, such as Operation Rolling Thunder (1965–1968), the bombing of Laos and Cambodia (1970), and the Christmas bombing of Hanoi (1972), as illustrated in the graph below:[19]

16 Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, p. 56.
17 Ibid. p. 58.
18 Åke Kilander, *Vietnam var nära: En berättelse om FNL-rörelsen och solidaritetsarbetet i Sverige 1965–1975,* Leopold Förlag, 2007, p. 160.
19 Graph produced with Google Sheets – Ulf Bjereld, *Kritiker eller medlare? Sveriges utrikespolitiska roller 1945–1990*, p. 127.



Conversely, condemnations became muted during standstills in the bombing, as well as when the Paris Peace Talks became more prominent and negotiations intensified. The domestic nature of the criticism is made more apparent when one breaks down the type of *kritikutsagor* ('statements of criticism') issued by the government. Of the 103 official criticisms, 59% were ideological or moral in nature, whereas a mere 11% referred to *folkrätt* (international law).[20] This was especially true of Palme, who saw moral statements as compatible with Sweden's policy of neutrality, that 'neutrality policy does not condemn [Sweden] to silence', and that 'silence can be the ally of injustice.'[21]

Swedish criticism was limited mostly, though not exclusively, to the US bombing of North Vietnam. Of the above mentioned 103 *kritikutsagor*, 87 were targeted at the United States, mostly for what it was doing in the North, with only 11 reserved for the government in Saigon. Though criticism was made of the spillover of the conflict into neighbouring Cambodia and Laos, it was not on the same scale.[22] This can partially be explained by the lack of media coverage. Individuals like the leading anti-war activist and intellectual Professor Noam Chomsky actively met with editors of the *New York Times* and *Dagens Nyheter*, but to no avail, the excuse given being that it was 'not the right story.'[23] In North

20 Ibid.
21 'Neutralitetspolitiken innebär ingen strävan till isolering… Neutralitetspolitiken dömer oss inte till tystnad. Tystnaden kan vara oförrättens bundsförvant.' Andrén, Nils and Möller, Yngve, *Från Undén till Palme: Svensk utrikespolitik efter andra världskriget,* Norstedts Förlag AB, 1990, p. 82–3.
22 Example of Cambodia criticism from both 1970 and 1973, see *New York Times* 27 April 1973.
23 Noam Chomsky, Personal Communication, 4 August 2018.

Vietnam, American reporters were largely absent. Broadcasters like NBC and CBS had to depend on Swedish reporters, with the Pentagon forced to partially backtrack on their denial regarding the bombing that posed a danger to the Red River dikes.[24] The coverage of Laos and Cambodia, on the other hand, was far more restricted, with the bombing kept mostly under wraps. In the case of the former, the international press corps reported President Richard Nixon's (false) claims that North Vietnamese tanks had encircled the Laotian capital of Vientiane 'while the correspondents sending the stories were ridiculing the tales in the hotel bar, where they seemed to spend most of their time.'[25] As a result, Swedish criticism continued to be self-contained and limited to the severe, though relatively speaking less horrific, attacks on North Vietnam.

Qualitatively, Swedish criticism varied greatly depending on the audience. This fact did not go unnoticed by the State Department. The US Mission to the United Nations noted that Nilsson's criticism of the US bombing in 1965 was less harsh in New York than in Stockholm, since the former was not directed at a domestic audience.[26] This held true even a decade later, with the National Security Council noting in a memo to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that in light of a left-wing Social Democratic parliamentarian calling 'for an intensive week-long anti-US campaign... the [Swedish] government probably will seek to distance itself from anti-US demonstrations', and that 'the Palme government probably has little stomach for a resurgence of anti-US sentiment at this time.'[27]

3. American Reactions and Pressure

Beginning with Palme's Gävle Speech, American reactions were consistently negative towards Swedish criticisms of the American war effort. Repeatedly, the United States government lashed out with various threats, ranging from a cut to arms exports to economic sanctions. However, such threats were never acted upon. Rather, the US government sought to induce pressure, particularly indirectly and through diplomacy, in order to push the Swedish government towards a more pro-US position. This was a pattern that reproduced itself on a number of occasions, with each bringing with it a new series of threats, only for the American government to limit itself to diplomatic pressure.

One of the earliest flare-ups in Swedish-American relations occurred around the Russell Tribunal. Organised by the philosophers Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre, the tribunal

24 Erik Eriksson, *Jag såg kärleken och döden*, Ordupplaget, 2008, p. 164.
25 Chomsky, Personal Communication, 4 August 2018.
26 'The Situation In South Vietnam, Weekly Report' (13 October 1965) https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00472A001800040002-7.pdf.
27 'Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger – Swedish Leftists Revive Vietnam Issue (18 January 1974) https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-43-4-8-1.pdf.

sought to criticise American conduct in the Vietnam War. While originally organised to be hosted in London and then Paris, it was moved to Stockholm after both the British and French governments sought to prevent them from taking place in their respective countries, despite formal governmental opposition to the War in Vietnam. The decision to move the proceedings to Stockholm did not sit well with the Government of Sweden (GOS). Privately, Erlander and other government officials had pleaded with Russell not to bring the tribunal to Sweden, since it could potentially hinder the country's ability to act as a possible future mediator in the Vietnam conflict.[28] However, mounting internal pressure resulted in the proceedings finally being allowed to go ahead.

The US government was swift in vocalising its opposition to the Tribunal. In December 1966, US Consul-General Turner C. Cameron publicly said that President Johnson was 'disappointed and disturbed' by the allowing of the tribunal to continue in Stockholm.[29] Walt Rostow, Johnson's National Security Adviser, met Erlander in Bonn for Konrad Adenauer's funeral and conveyed (in what Erlander described as a 'rather animated discussion') the president's concern and warned that Swedish-American relations were sure to suffer if Stockholm did not rescind the invitation, a mischaracterisation since the Government of Sweden did not actually invite the participants.[30] During the proceedings, the US Embassy issued a statement saying that Swedes would do well to remember the role the United States had played in maintaining the peace in Western Europe. While the potential existed for a crippling breakdown in relations, Swedish public opinion prevented this from occurring. The negative press and public reaction to the proceedings, which viewed the trial as being unfair to the United States, resulted in Cameron cabling Secretary of State Dean Rusk and cautioning against any overly aggressive American response, e.g. economic sanctions or a 'counter-tribunal' attacking communist conduct, in light of the public response.[31] While formal retaliation did not come to fruition, the affair was not without negative side effects, with Erlander noting in his own diary that Fletcher, a Washington Post journalist, had succeeded in his goal 'to injure Sweden in the USA' through his coverage of the whole affair.[32]

Perhaps the most damaging moment in Swedish-American relations during the Johnson Administration occurred during a torchlit march on 29 February 1968. On that night, Palme addressed a group of anti-war demonstrators and then marched alongside Nguyen Tho Chan, the North Vietnamese ambassador to Moscow. In the face of American pressure, party officials claimed that Nguyen's participation was spontaneous and not

28 Göteborgs handels- och sjöfartstidning 6 Dec. 1966.
29 Fredrik Logevall, 'The Swedish-American Conflict Over Vietnam,' Diplomatic History, Volume 17, Issue 3, 1 July 1993, p. 429.
30 Ibid.
31 Cameron to Rusk, 5 May 1967, White House Country File 277, box 68, Johnson Library.
32 'Att skada Sverige i USA' Tage Erlander, *Tage Erlander Dagböcker 1966–1967*, p. 102.

planned – a clear fabrication since Nilsson had given permission to Nguyen to join the demonstration.[33] Both Erlander and Nilsson reiterated to US Ambassador William Heath the immense importance that lay in not permitting the Communists to seize a monopoly on the increasingly important question of Vietnam. However, this did not prevent Heath from being called back to Washington for 'consultations', an act that was widely covered in the American media as well as in Sweden, where it was viewed suspiciously as a silencing tactic.[34] At the same time, US Embassy officials in Stockholm acknowledged that any present disagreements had to be balanced against long term interests, and consequently warned Washington not to overreact since Vietnam protests were the exception and not the rule in the totality of Swedish-American relations, which were otherwise generally strong.

Both during and after his tenure, Swedish governmental attitudes towards Heath were decidedly negative. In his memoir, Nilsson went to great lengths to contrast the wisdom and experience of diplomats of countries that were not aligned with Sweden, such as Soviet ambassador Victor Maltsev and Francoist Spain's ambassador José Felipe Alcover y Sureda, with that of Heath, which he summarised as consisting of the belief that the Earth consisted 'for him all the rich source that gave fodder to animals and oil for petrol-driven cars.'[35] Yngve Möller, a career diplomat who was later appointed ambassador to the United States, simply described Heath as Johnson's 'ranch neighbour.'[36] Nilsson and Möller were by no means alone in emphasising Heath's non-diplomatic credentials, as well as the ambassador's general lack of interest in Sweden, its culture, history, etc.

Matters were further complicated by Heath's rather Manichaean approach to the Cold War as a fight between good and evil. This predilection was made abundantly clear through his fondness to remind the Swedish public of the respective roles of the United States and Sweden during the Second World War and the parallels that he perceived with the fighting in Southeast Asia.[37] The resentful attitude held towards Heath was not reserved only for career diplomats, but applied also to the Prime Minister. Prior to Heath's recall, Erlander recorded in the days that followed his sheer astonishment with the American position, as well as its messenger. 'Are the Americans mad?' the Prime Minister asked himself before going on to acknowledge that trade ties could very well suffer, before ending with 'How am I supposed to say any appreciative words about the USA [sic].'[38] Heath actually

33 Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, p. 94.
34 Ibid.
35 'Jorden var för honom all rikedoms källa som gav foder åt djuren och olja för de bensindrivna bilarna.' Torsten Nilsson, *Åter Vietnam: Memoarer och reportage,* Kristianstad: Kristianstads Boktryckeri AB, 1981, pp. 137–8.
36 'Ranchgranne' Yngve Möller, *Sverige och Vietnamkriget*, Falun: Scandbook, 1992, p. 121.
37 For an example see *New York Times*, 17 July 1968.
38 'Är amerikanerna skvatt galna?... Och hur ska jag nu kunna säja några uppskattande ord om USA.' NB: the second sentence, though phrased as a question, is punctuated with a period – Erlander, *Dagböcker 1968*, p. 21.

managed to squander Swedish goodwill, since a plurality of Swedes in fact agreed with the State Department in believing it was a mistake for Palme to march with Ambassador Nguyen.[39] However, by attacking the Swedish government over Palme's conduct, Heath simply alienated the Swedish populace even more.

Friction between Stockholm and D.C. was not limited simply to the executive branches. In the case of the United States, Congress was highly critical of Swedish conduct, even if it was not a high priority issue that led to intense scrutiny. Yet the issue that animated members of the Hill was not the same as that which bothered the White House. Rather, it was the Swedish treatment of American deserters that caused the wrath of Congressmen. Beginning in the late 1960's, a slow stream of American soldiers began arriving in Sweden. The total number of American deserters in Sweden was always marginal, never exceeding six hundred, paling in comparison to the amount that the United States' northern neighbour was hosting.[40] In fact, the number was tiny compared to other groups that had immigrated to Sweden for political reasons, with almost 2,000 Czechoslovaks arriving in Sweden in the first six months of 1970 alone.[41]

The most vocal critic of Sweden's acceptance of deserters in the Congress was Senator Strom Thurmond. While advocating economic sanctions, Thurmond attacked what he perceived was the Nordic country's attempt 'to encourage men to be disloyal to their country.'[42] Likewise, Louisiana Congressman John Rivers called for the US Embassy to be converted into a consulate as retaliation for Sweden causing American servicemen to abandon their posts and 'become traitors to their country.'[43] Fellow Congressman John Rarick agreed with this assessment and joined the call for sanctions, believing that the deserters were actively siding against the United States in Vietnam. However, condemnation was not universal, with some, like Senator J. William Fulbright, growing increasingly sympathetic to the Swedish position, especially in light of the threat of boycotting Sweden issued by union leader Teddy Gleason, head of the Longshoremen's Association.[44] Ultimately, both the Congressional and private sector threats failed to materialise into concrete actions. To some degree, even Congressmen understood the political and non-ideological component of the deserter question, with a September 1971 report composed by the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe noting that 'the Social Democratic government has received the publicity it wanted with the Intrepid

39 Henrik Berggren, *Underbara dagar framför oss: En biografi över Olof Palme,* Norstedts Förlag AB, 2010, p. 391.
40 Logevall, 'Swedish-American Conflict,' p. 438.
41 Johan Erlandsson, *Desertörerna,* Stockholm: Carlsson Bokförlag, 2016, p. 142.
42 Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969 vol. 115, pt 26:35116.
43 Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970 vol. 116, pt 10:13885.
44 Möller, *Sverige och Vietnamkriget*, p. 125.

Four and now wished the deserters and their personal problems would quietly leave."[45] Likewise, the White House was itself non-dogmatic on the question of deserters, with Nixon only opposing amnesty as long as Americans were still deployed in Vietnam, and as long as North Vietnam held American POWs.[46]

Despite not experiencing any formal retaliation for the hosting of deserters, the GOS genuinely feared the risks posed to bilateral relations. As such, attempts were made to mitigate the situation. While FNL groups advocated for granting political asylum to the American deserters, the government took a firm stance against it. Instead, they opted for humanitarian asylum, which had to be periodically renewed. The primary distinction between the two statuses lay in the fact that humanitarian asylum made one still liable for deportation in the case of a crime having been committed. This grew to be particularly relevant as public apathy, and later antipathy, grew towards the deserters in light of a series of crimes perpetrated by some of them, ranging from robbery to sex with underage girls.[47] The main aim of not issuing political asylum was to not aggravate US-Swedish relations. According to Anders Ferm, an advisor to Palme, 'to give [the deserters] political asylum was part politically dumb and for Sweden's part a worthless point. To needlessly create additional irritation against the USA was just stupid."[48]

The decision to extend formal recognition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) by Sweden represents an attempted balancing act whereby the government sought to placate its domestic electoral base without harming relations with the United States. Despite left-wing agitation, the Swedish Cabinet promised the Johnson Administration in 1966 that it would not recognise Hanoi, yet by 1967 even the Center Party, an opposition party, had introduced legislation calling for the establishment of full relations with North Vietnam.[49] The ostensible justification for not recognising the DRV given in 1966, namely the hope to act as a possible mediator, was no longer viable by 1968. It should be remembered, however, that even at this stage support for recognition was not universal in Sweden, but rather reflected an internal question within the Social Democratic Party. In fact, only 30% of the population supported recognition while 48% found themselves opposed.[50]

This balancing act took the form of carefully timing the recognition. Official recognition of North Vietnam by Sweden took place on 10 January 1969, scheduled for the transitional

45 Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, p. 153 – NB: 'Intrepid Four' refers to four deserters (who served on the aircraft carrier *USS Intrepid*) whose arrival became particularly prominent in the media.
46 'More than 50,000 Americans killed in Vietnam,' New York Times, 24 December 1972.
47 Erlandsson, *Desertörerna,* p. 147 – examples of crimes include two New York-born deserters robbing a series of pharmacies in Uppland.
48 'Att ge dem politisk asyl var dels politiskt dumt, dels en för Sverige värdelös poäng. Att i onödan skapa ytterligare ett irritationsmoment mot USA var bara korkat' Erlandsson, *Desertörerna,* p. 141.
49 Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, p. 174.
50 Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, p. 185.

period between the outgoing Johnson administration and the incoming Nixon one, with the hope that this would result in less attention being drawn to Stockholm. US State Department officials had seen recognition as being inevitable but still undesirable. Regardless of Swedish desires, the recognition did not go unnoticed in Washington. Within three days, presidential advisor Robert Murphy suggested that the incoming Nixon administration should maintain a tough line and possibly introduce trade sanctions.[51] Ultimately, however, Nixon chose not to act as forcefully as suggested and instead simply withheld nominating a new ambassador upon the end of Heath's tenure, as well as closing the consulate in Gothenburg.

The primary purpose of recognising the DRV was for the Social Democratic government to placate both its left-wing base as well as to contain radical left agitation around the question of Vietnam. On this fundamental goal, the government failed. Rather than pacifying leftist desires, the act of recognising Hanoi simply emboldened the left, particularly the FNL groups. Consequently, the recognition of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), i.e. the political arm of the FNL, became the new goal. This forced the Social Democratic Party, more so than the government itself, to take an increasingly left-wing position. This explains why the party invited a chief PRG negotiator at Paris to address a May Day rally in Stockholm in 1972, following renewed American bombing of North Vietnam, itself a response to the communist Spring Offensive.[52] This propelled a snowball effect resulting in first the Social Democratic Party inviting PRG Foreign Minister Madame Thi Binh to the October 1972 Party Congress, as well as the Congress' embrace of the PRG Peace Plan, while simultaneously denouncing the American war effort as a 'human rights violation.'[53] This remained true even after US withdrawal from Vietnam, with the United States considering the Swedish upgrade of the PRG office to 'General Delegation' and the dropping of the RVN from the Swedish diplomatic list to be a 'virtual recognition of the 'PRG' by Sweden'. The US believed that 'this new move also shows that [the US Government] should have reacted more strongly to GOS upgrading of the 'PRG' office, as we [the US Embassy in Saigon] urged at the time.'[54]

The most notable aspect of the American response to the recognition of Hanoi is perhaps that it was carried out in the form of non-actions. Economic punishments, despite being threatened multiple times, were never implemented. Instead, both the Johnson and the Nixon administrations chose to recall or not to appoint ambassadors, respectively. There were two primary motivations for this particular course of action: a) it drew less attention to

51 13 Jan. 1969. Robert Murphy. Memo to the President-Elect Richard Nixon. Nixon Project. White House Special Files. 1969–1974. Country File: Sweden. Box 9.

52 Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, p. 225.

53 Ibid.

54 'Swedish Attitude on Vietnam Issues' (18 November 1974) https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974SAIGON14424_b.html.

the Swedish position than economic sanctions would have done, and b) it enabled continued bilateral cooperation, albeit on a lower tier, which will be covered in the next section. This reflects the fact that the American fear did not fundamentally stem from the Swedish critique itself, but rather from its potential impact on public opinion abroad of the United States. Being opposed to the war in Vietnam was by no means a unique position held by Sweden; in fact, it was shared by other European countries. The difference, however, was how vocal Sweden was. While President Charles de Gaulle of France had stated publicly his opposition to the US presence in Southeast Asia, he nevertheless sought not to alienate the United States either, as exemplified by the aforementioned refusal to host the Russell Tribunal.

What the United States anticipated to be the actual consequence of Swedish critique is never made fully clear in the internal records. What is clear, however, was that such criticism was to be counteracted quickly and thoroughly. An exploration into the realm of counterfactuals is useful, since it may enable one to better understand what motivated the United States' responses. Continued Swedish criticism had the potential of legitimising, and indeed emboldening and strengthening, the growing anti-war movement in the United States, and further diminishing the notion that the War was simply a clash between the so-called 'Free World' and the Communists. Externally, in the absence of any punitive response to Swedish criticism, other nations may have felt increasingly compelled, by virtue of their own growing radical student populations, to respond to and condemn American conduct. It is difficult to quantify either the likelihood or the impact of such a course of development, yet such a line of thinking can partially explain why the United States government feared Swedish criticism in the first place.

The clearest example of American non-action in bilateral relations came in the form of refusing to invite Palme to the White House during his visit to the United States in 1970. Palme, by now prime minister, was to accept an honorary degree from Kenyon College, his alma mater. Though he did meet Secretary of State William Rogers, his low-key visit paled in comparison to the grandiose reception of Finnish president Urho Kekkonen just a month earlier. Kekkonen, who held a largely ceremonial post, was received by his American counterpart, and the visit featured a state dinner, raised Finnish flags, a positive portrayal in the media, and ended with the White House reiterating its great confidence in Finland's neutrality policy.[55] The non-reception of foreign heads of state or governments was extremely rare in the United States, with the last person not to have been received by an American president having been Fidel Castro in 1960.[56]

55 'Rapport med synpunkter i anslutning till statsminister Palmes besök i USA 4/6–11/6 1970,' (1970-08-04), 1970 Arméattachén Hemliga skr. volym nr 1.

56 Ibid.

The appointment of a new ambassador to Sweden in 1970 reflects Nixon's attempt to normalise relations without fully getting over his dislike for the GOS, and was arguably meant to be a provocation. The naming of an ambassador came about partially as a result of pressure from figures such as William Ryan of New York, who in Congress in late 1969 pointed out that the United States had ambassadors to South Africa and the Soviet Union. Like Heath, Ambassador Jerome Holland was not a diplomat either, but instead a university president and sociologist, as well as a childhood friend and classmate of Secretary Rogers. Notably, Holland was also black, with the *Washington Post* believing the appointment of a black ambassador was meant to make it more difficult for protestors, who may be seen as racists.[57] If that was the intention it failed to come to pass, with Holland being called a 'housenigger' upon arrival in Sweden by an American deserter, and told 'nigger go home' by demonstrators after presenting his credentials to the king.[58]

Nixon's attempt to temper anti-war, and increasingly anti-American, demonstrations in Sweden proved to be futile. Virtually everywhere Holland went, FNL sympathisers were sure to show up. Just in the year 1970, FNL Groups showed up in Gothenburg (3 May), in Malmö (7 May), in Sundsvall (7–9 June), in Kiruna (7–9 July), at Karlbergsskolan in Åmål (3 September), at Chalmers Technical Institute in Gothenburg (4 September), outside of Västerås Cathedral (16 September), in Växjö (14 October), and in many other places.[59] These encounters often turned violent, resulting in damage to places like the American Cultural Center in Stockholm.[60] The intense need for security did not lessen tensions, with Holland later noting that 'as far as I know I am the only [US] Ambassador in Europe (including the USSR) that has to have a bodyguard at all times... the next US Ambassador [to Sweden] should receive hardship pay.'[61] Nevertheless, Holland did actively seek to promote economic ties and showed genuine interest in the country, as noted by his numerous travels beyond the confines of the capital.

The absolute nadir in Swedish-American ties came with the Christmas bombing of Hanoi in 1972. In 1965 only student activists were carrying placards calling Johnson 'Hitler's ghost,' with the government avoiding such analogies at all cost.[62] However, in the midst of the mass bombing campaign launched by the United States against North Vietnam, Palme personally crafted and delivered his harshest criticism:

57 Möller, *Sverige och Vietnamkriget*, p. 237.
58 Ibid., p. 238.
59 Kilander, *Vietnam var nära*, p. 159.
60 Möller, *Sverige och Vietnamkriget*, p. 239.
61 Holland, as cited in Newsweek 27 June 1972.
62 Kilander, *Vietnam var nära*, p. 103.

> … And that is why the bombings are an atrocity. And of that we have many examples in modern history. And they are in general connected with a name: Guernica, Oradour, Babi Yar, Katyn, Lidice, Sharpeville, Treblinka. There, violence has triumphed. But the judgement of the world after has fallen hard on those who carry this responsibility. Now another name is added to the row: Hanoi, Christmas 1972.[63]

Jultalet ('The Christmas Speech') was the first, and only, time when the government directly compared American actions in Vietnam to those of Nazi Germany. Considering that Palme had written out the speech himself (albeit without any consultation, his foreign minister having been on vacation in West Africa[64]), it appears that he did not fully grasp the significance that a Nazi comparison would carry in the United States. With both Nixon and Kissinger enraged (the latter having himself fled Nazi Germany due to his Jewish roots), the risk of economic sanctions reemerged. With unprecedented criticism from a generally friendly nation, one could naturally expect an unprecedented retaliation to such criticism. However, once again cognisant of the risk of legitimising Swedish attacks, the two men decided at a retreat at Key Biscayne instead to opt for a diplomatic freeze.[65] The mere act of criticising the United States, irrespective of the severity of language, was not enough to compel it to respond with full non-military force, which it had contemplated and ruled out before.

Unlike in previous attacks, however, Sweden was not alone in the risk of being diplomatically damaged. The Christmas bombing of Hanoi had triggered widespread condemnation, with relations being damaged with multiple countries. Denmark, India, and Australia (the latter of which had even deployed troops to aid the American war effort until just a few weeks earlier that month) all being threatened with diplomatic sanctions by the United States.[66] In fact, Kissinger later bemoaned the fact that 'not one NATO ally supported us or even hinted at understanding our position.'[67] Nevertheless, Sweden continued to be singled out, with the other countries all restoring ties to pre-bombing levels relatively quickly. Admittedly, Swedish criticism was particularly unique. In addition to the Nazi comparison, the usually non-political head of state, King Gustaf VI Adolf, described

63 'Och därför är bombningarna ett illdåd. Och av det har vi många exempel i den moderna historien. Och de är i allmänhet förbundna med ett namn: Guernica, Oradour, Babij Jar, Katyń, Lidice, Sharpeville, Treblinka. Där har våldet triumferat. Men eftervärldens dom har fallit hård över dem som burit ansvaret. Nu fogas ett nytt namn till raden: Hanoi, julen 1972.' Palme, 23 December 1972 http://www.olofpalme.org/1972/12/23/uttalande-om-usas-bombningar-av-hanoi-julen-1972/ .

64 There appears to be some disagreement about Wickman's exact location at the time, as *Neutralitetens Tid* (p. 107) claims he was in the Gambia whereas *Ekot från Vietnam* (p. 165) states that he was in Ghana.

65 Logevall, 'The Swedish-American Conflict,' p. 441.

66 Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Boston: Little Brown, 1979, pp. 1453–1454.

67 Edited by Marc Jason Gilbert, *Why the North Won the Vietnam War*, New York: Palgrave, 2002, p. 92.

the offensive as a 'merciless bombing.'[68] It is possible, however, that had Sweden been the sole critic of the Christmas bombing the White House may have felt more emboldened to act without risking relations with other states.

4. Continued US-Swedish Cooperation

Understanding the deterioration of diplomatic relations and their political roots is necessary in order to assess the remarkable military relations that endured. Rather than viewing security cooperation as a by-product of the diplomatic relations, it is more accurate to approach the topic as consisting of two parallel and concurrent streams with limited overlap. The independence from one another suggests, as will be shown, different sets of pressures and motives that affect conduct, rather than a shared decision making process that trickles down.

With ties at historically low levels, it would be natural to assume that this would have had a domino effect on all levels of bilateral relations. However, upon closer examination, this turns out not to be the case. Rather, below the ambassadorial level, relations appear to have largely remained unaffected. This is principally attributable to the fact that the strategic aims of both the United States and Sweden did not diverge in any meaningful ways in the years 1965–1975. Economic ties continued without interruption. Perhaps more interesting is how little military ties were affected and how intelligence cooperation actually increased.

Prior to Swedish criticisms, the US Department of Defense (DOD) held a positive view of the Nordic country. In a report on Sweden issued by the Directorate of Special Studies at the Office of the Chief of Staff, the US Army explicitly stated that it 'would be wrong, of course, to exaggerate the political differences between the United States and Sweden, since in essentials the ultimate objectives of the two countries are closely parallel.'[69] Even after Palme began publicly criticising the United States, the tone from the Pentagon was still very favourable. For example, in a letter written by Col. Robert Marsh, director of the Defense Supply Agency, offering to sell surplus materiel to *Krigsmakten* (the Swedish Ministry of Defence), the director states that such goods are 'available for sale to friendly foreign governments,'[70] with a letter written a month later that is almost identical in content and formulation stating explicitly that the friendly government is indeed Sweden.[71]

68 Logevall, 'Swedish-American Conflict,' p. 442 – NB: The journal article incorrectly attributes it to 'Gustaf IV Adolf' rather than the reigning monarch 'Gustaf VI Adolf.' 'Gustav IV Adolf' (with a v) was deposed during the Napoleonic Wars.

69 'Situation Report on Sweden,' (1963-10-04), Arméattachén i Washington, 1967 nr 8.

70 'Letter from the Defense Supply Agency to Army Attaché Wahlgren,' (1966-02-24), Arméattachén i Washington, 1966 nr 7.

71 'Letter from the Defense Supply Agency to Army Attaché Ståhl,' (1966-03-23), Arméattachén i Washington, 1966 nr 7.

The topic of Vietnam is rarely featured in official correspondence, either between the army attaché at the Swedish Embassy in Washington and the Swedish military headquarters on the one hand, or the army attaché and Pentagon officials on the other. While the role of Vietnam in bilateral ties is mentioned semi-frequently in 1972, it is non-existent throughout the 1960s. In fact, in the previously classified documents featuring Swedish Embassy-Pentagon correspondence, only a single letter in 1966 mentions Vietnam, and is of a medical nature (asking for information regarding vaccinations given to American troops prior to deployment to Southeast Asia).[72]

The divergence between the White House-GOS relations on the one hand and the DOD and *Krigsmakten* on the other is a consistent theme throughout the first half of the 1970s. In a conversation between Lt. Col. Frykhammar, a Swedish student at the US Army Intelligence School, and Robert P. Goold, from the Bureau of European Affairs (subdepartment: NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs), the former summarised the latter's attitude that '"on all levels except the absolute highest official" there were none who held any resentment against Sweden' and that 'cooperation worked without any problems.'[73] Such attitudes were mutual, with Swedish army attaché Col. Carl-Gustaf Ståhl having previously written a letter to Maj. Gen. William P. Yarborough, the Assistant Chief of Staff for the Intelligence Headquarters at the Department of the Army, where he stated that he sought to 'keep and to improve even further the good relationship with the United States Army and to emphasise that the Swedish Army wants this relationship to be of mutual benefit.'[74]

In many ways, both sides, though particularly the Swedish side, sought to increase bilateral military cooperation. The Swedish Chief of the Defence Staff, Lt. Gen. Stig Synnergren, actively sought to increase contact with the Pentagon by accrediting an army attaché to the Joint Staff, via the Defense Intelligence Agency, an idea that Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was receptive to and indeed sought to reciprocate in Stockholm.[75] Such contact was conducted almost entirely and directly on a military-to-military basis, with little involvement of either the State Department/White House or their Swedish equivalents. Even after *Jultalet*, when 'it was known – though not officially conveyed – that a meeting on the top level is not forthcoming,'[76] it was still

72 'Letter to Foreign Liaison Officer,' (1966-10-04), Arméattachén i Washington, 1966 nr 7.

73 '"På all nivåer utom de absolut högsta officiella" var det numera ingem som helst avog inställning mot Sverige. Samarbetet fungerade utan problem.' – 'Amerikansk syn på Sverige just nu,' (1970-03-24), 1970 Arméattachén Hemliga skr. volym nr 1.

74 'Letter to Major General William P. Yarborough from Ståhl,' (1967-12-05), Arméattachén i Washington, 1967 nr 8.

75 'Letter to the Chief of Defence Staff, Lt. General Stig Synnergren, from Ståhl,' (1970-02-17), 1970 Arméattachén Hemliga skr. volym nr 1.

76 'Det är känt – fast icke officiellt meddelat försvarsavdelningen – att besök på topp-nivå icke får förekomma' 'PM angående de aktuella militära kontakterna USA-Sverige,' (1973-03-06), Utgående och inkomna skrivelser 1973 Arméattachén volym nr 26.

understood that 'military technical cooperation is not considered to have been impacted.'[77] This did not mean, however, that ongoing military ties were inherently immune from being affected by the diplomatic crisis. Military attachés in the Washington Embassy were fully aware that a continued deterioration of 'political ties to the USA' could negatively impact everything, from information sharing to military education exchanges, resulting in tangible and negative effects.[78] Nevertheless, in the weeks leading up to *Jultalet*, the military attachés repeatedly emphasised the good relations between the two countries, particularly in regard to naval cooperation. The secret to this success rested in official visits by officers in the two countries.

Swedish military officials were particularly eager to engage in high level visits with their American counterparts. This came to pass, with figures like Lt. Gen. Bo Westin, Chief of the Defence Staff, and Vice-Admiral Lundvall, Chief of the Navy, both visiting the United States in 1972 with the observed impact of strengthening relations at the defence level.[79] Particularly remarkable is the fact that despite that diplomatic relations had not fully healed from the falling out in 1967–69, DOD confidence in the Swedish armed forces was almost completely untouched even though department spokesmen were hindered by White House implemented restrictions.[80] Contacts were not restricted to the American mainland, with Swedish officials inviting figures like the above mentioned Maj. Gen. Yarborough to visit places like the Swedish Defence Staff, the Swedish Army Staff, and the Research Institute of National Defense.[81]

The exchange of technology and materiel remained steady and durable throughout the period encompassing the Vietnam War. The scope and range of armaments and information shared and sold between the two were wide reaching. Explicit permission was granted to the transporting of secret materiel via the US military base at Frankfurt am Main, with explosive materiel to be transported via Ramstein.[82] Just months after Sweden's public condemnation of the US expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia, Anders Thunborg, the second most senior official at the Swedish Ministry of Defence, and John S. Foster, a Deputy Director of Research and Engineering at the DOD, were still in talks about the possible sales of AIM-7E air-to-air missiles.[83] Two years later, Dr Foster did not deviate

77 'I fråga om det militärtekniska samarbetet så tycks detta för närvarande icke ha påverkats' Ibid.
78 'Politiska förbindelserna till USA' 'De aktuella militära kontakterna USA-Sverige,' (1973-03-06), Utgående och inkomna skrivelser 1973 Arméattachén volym nr 26.
79 'Utkast till ambassadens årsredogörelse 1972,' (1972-12-05), Utgående och inkomna skrivelser 1972 Arméattachén volym nr 19.
80 'PM för försvarsstabschefen. Generallöjtnant Bo Westin med synpunkter med synpunkter på förbindelserna USA-Sverige,' (1972-07-18), Utgående och inkomna skrivelser 1972 Arméattachén volym nr 19
81 'Letter to Major General William P. Yarborough from Ståhl,' (1967-12-05).
82 'Skeppningar av hemlig materiel via Frankfurt,' (1970-04-02), Utgående och inkomna skrivelser 1970 Arméattachén volym nr 2.
83 'Anteckningar från Statssekreterare Thunborgs samtal i Department of Defense/Pentagon 1970.10.21,' (1970-10-24), 1970 Arméattachén Hemliga skr. volym nr 1.

when he recommended 'increased direct contact between the American and Swedish armament industries in order to increase exchange of knowledge and experience,' with General Westmoreland agreeing.[84] The same applied to technical information sharing, such as the Swedish army attaché requesting 'kind assistance in getting possible United States Army reports on test and evaluation of different 35 m.m. cameras' from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in order 'to study before a decision on the procurement' for the Swedish military was to be made.[85]

Despite the generally warm feelings held by the two armed forces towards one another, the political circumstances of the times meant that this was not without limits. Army attaché Geijer reported an encounter with a Pentagon official that illustrated the reservations held by the DOD towards Sweden's openness to the DRV. Following a meeting with DOD officials in which an American officer noted that 'Sweden has an ambassador in Hanoi who sends reports,' Geijer attended an evening party featuring another American officer from that same meeting who stated that 'we read his reports.'[86] However, such espionage was by no means unique nor particularly insidious. To a significant extent, such surveillance had less to do with the Swedes themselves but rather with developments within North Vietnam. Nevertheless, by 1972, leading American military officials like Lt. Gen. Philpott, Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency, were of the belief that an 'understanding and to some degree appreciation of the Swedish policy of neutrality' existed within the American government since 'the Vietnam War no longer infected ties between our countries.'[87]

Swedish criticism and collaboration did not manifest themselves in a sequential order. Rather, during the earlier Johnson period, the two often went hand-in-hand. Namely, there existed overt criticism at the same time as Sweden covertly acted as a third-party mediator between Washington and Hanoi, which was termed Aspen (a reference to the ski resort in Colorado that mirrored the Swedish climate).[88] Aspen was established in 1966, in other words before North Vietnam had even been recognised by Sweden. This posed a series of problems. How would this impact Sino-Swedish relations? Would Sweden be

84 'ökad direkt kontakt i första hand mellan svensk och amerikansk industri för att utbyta kunskaper och erfarenheter' – 'Anteckningar från samtal kring internationell samverkan ifråga om framtagningar av försvarsmateriel,' (1972-01-05), Utgående och inkomna skrivelser 1972 Arméattachén volym nr 19.

85 'Letter from Ståhl to Office of the Assistant Chief of staff for Intelligence,' (1968-03-06), Arméattachén i Washington 1968 nr 9.

86 'Sverige har dock en ambassadör i Hanoi som skickar rapporter' & 'vi läser hans rapporter' 'Samtal med officer i Pentagon angående svenska ambassadörens i Hanoi rapporter,' (1972-08-10), Utgående och inkomna skrivelser 1972 Arméattachén volym nr 19.

87 'förståelsen för och i viss mån även uppskattningen av den svenska neutralitetspolitiken hade ökat hos den amerikanska regeringen. Detta var bl a en följd av att Vietnamkriget inte längre infekterade förbindelserna mellan våra länder' – 'Rapport efter överlämning i Department of Defense, föatt Öv Ståhl till Ov Geijer, 1972-02-24,' (1972-02-29), Utgående och inkomna skrivelser 1972 Arméattachén volym nr 19.

88 Jean-Christophe Öberg, *Varför Vietnam? Ett kapitel i svensk utrikespolitik 1965–1970*, Kristianstad: Kristianstads Boktryckeri AB, 1985, p. 47.

seen as an American stooge? If revealed, what would it mean for Hanoi to be seen dealing with the United States? While the United States covertly favoured Sweden's continued role as *'kanalisatörer,'*[89] the internal and external risks posed to Sweden were immense, resulting in extensive efforts made by Sweden to act as a back-channel between the two warring parties with the hope of remaining friendly with both. The utilisation of Swedish diplomatic resources is illustrated by the fact that contact with the FNL was made through the Swedish Embassy in Algiers, while contact with the DRV was conducted through their respective embassies in Warsaw.[90]

Ultimately, Aspen failed to produce any tangible results, ending following its exposure in the newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* on 23 March 1968. Yet eight days later, Johnson announced a cessation to the bombing north of the 20th parallel, resulting in the DRV announcing three days afterwards their readiness to engage in direct negotiations.[91] Chronologically, this may appear as a posthumous product of Aspen at best. A similar act of mediation geared more towards ameliorating Swedish-American relations was regarding the issue of American prisoners of war. Over the course of Operation Rolling Thunder, a number of American pilots had been shot down over the skies of North Vietnam due to the effectiveness of DRV air defences. During Palme's visit to the United States, Rogers emphasised the American government's gratitude for his efforts to liberate the pilots,[92] as did the DOD.[93] Though it failed to produce any meaningful results, this Swedish initiative, like Aspen, was invaluable in terms of improving and solidifying Swedish-American relations.

Cooperation was not limited to just Southeast Asian diplomacy or restricted to bilateral military cooperation, but in fact extended to intelligence, especially as gathered in Sweden itself. The largest scandal to break out in Sweden during the Palme years was the IB Affair. In 1958, the IB Group formed under Birger Elmér as a result of US requirements for better security risk management (i.e. against communists) in order to enhance defence industry cooperation. The result of this came in the form of an operation involving more than 20 agents (with many others also employed), with 30,000 individuals having their names registered due to political/ideological suspicions.[94] The 1960s had posed two different consequences of Swedish intelligence: a) increased radicalisation, which meant more resources redirected to *Säkerhetspolisen* ('Security Police,' SÄPO) and IB in order to track

89 Roughly translated as 'canal conductors' or 'channel enablers,' i.e. a back-channel – Ibid. p. 47.
90 Ibid. p. 48.
91 Bjereld, *Kritiker eller medlare?* p. 120.
92 'Rapport med synpunkter i anslutning till statsminister Palmes besök i USA 4/6–11/6 1970,' (1970-08-04), 1970 Arméattachén Hemliga skr. volym nr 1.
93 'Frågan om de amerikanska krigsfångarna i Nordvietnam,' (1970-10-14), 1970 Arméattachén Hemliga skr. volym nr 1.
94 Kjell Östberg, *När vinden vände: Olof Palme 1969–1986,* Leopard Förlag, 2009, p. 148.

Vietnam activists, (Swedish) conscientious objectors, and new left wing groups, and b) a 1969 law banning *'åsiktsregistrering'* (but which had no actual impact on surveillance).[95]

On 3 May 1973, the magazine *Folk i Bild/Kulturfront*, based on reporting by journalists Peter Bratt and Jan Guillou, exposed the IB Affair. Much of the inner workings of IB remains unknown. For example, even the initials are not fully deciphered, with the name possibly being an acronym for either *Informationsbyrån* or *Inhämtning, Birger*.[96] The affair included both surveillance of leftist activists and covert operations. This was done in collaboration with foreign intelligence agencies, particularly Israel's Shin Bet, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency. The exposure revealed not only the existence of such activities, but also seemingly socially non-useful information, such as the radio codes of various embassies that *Försvarets Radioanstalt* (Defence Ministry's signals intelligence division) had cracked. The exposure of the intelligence operation damaged Palme's standing, particularly amongst fellow Social Democrats. This was especially true following the arrests of Bratt and Guillou, who were charged and subsequently convicted for harming national security. Criticism came not only from Swedes, but also resulted in an open letter from Günter Grass, Max Frisch, and three other German writers who compared the arrest of Bratt and Guillou to the Nazis silencing Carl von Ossietzky, the Soviet harassing of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and the Nixon administration attacking Daniel Ellsberg.[97]

Despite the criticism, Palme remained unwavering through it all and maintained its legitimacy and its importance. He even went so far as to claim that it was necessary for Sweden to 'remain independent.'[98] However, this was objectively not the case. Håkan Isaksson, a former IB operative, revealed that agents would get assignments from the CIA. These assignments targeted Swedish citizens and would be carried out by IB.[99] The targets for espionage included not only communists or American deserters. In fact, many of the leftists who were spied upon shared a lot of the same beliefs as the governing Social Democrats. For example, journalists such as Dieter Strand and Gunnar Fredriksson, who worked for the Social Democratic-leaning newspaper *Aftonbladet*, were victims of surveillance by SÄPO. However, even though the bulk of surveillance and consequential intelligence flowed out, the Swedish state did indeed receive intelligence from the United States. In March 1973, the Swedish Ministry of Defence received a list of names of members of *Svenska Revolutionära Marxisters Förbund* (Swedish Revolutionary Marxists' League), which had been compiled by the Defence Intelligence Agency's Eastern Area Office.[100]

95 'Viewpoint registration', i.e. registration of people based on political ideologies – Ibid. p. 152.
96 'Information bureau' and 'Gathering, Birger,' respectively. Henrik Berggren, *Underbara dagar framför oss: En biografi över Olof Palme,* Norstedts Förlag AB, 2010, p. 474.
97 Ibid. p. 481.
98 Ibid.
99 Eriksson, *Jag såg kärleken*, p. 178.
100 'Brev till Försvarsstaben från Håkan Linde, Armédirektör,' (1973-03-26), Utgående och inkomna skrivelser 1973 Arméattachén volym nr 26.

While this article limits itself primarily to the military and intelligence realms, it is worth noting that the transatlantic bonds between Sweden and the United States went beyond that. These ties were initially rooted in the mass emigration of Swedes to the New World, which also included a significant number of returnees. As the historian Dag Blanck notes, '[t]o the majority of Swedes of the broader strata of the population, however, the emigrants or the returning Swedish Americans were the primary sources of information about the U.S. and life in the American republic.'[101] Naturally, this bond was not just one-way, with the postwar Swedish welfare state gaining notice in the United States, as demonstrated by the research by Dr Carl Marklund and Professor Klaus Petersen.[102] As a consequence of migration being primarily from Sweden to the United States, with most of the reverse migration being returnees, as well as the sheer imbalances in terms of population and economy, the sociocultural legacy of cultural exchange created a greater American imprint in Sweden than the other way around, thereby explaining the general Americanophilic attitude that often prevailed. Though the positive bonds largely cover the history of bilateral relations, it is worth noting it was not always to the same extent, with some fluctuations such as during the Second World War due to Swedish-German ties.

5. Vietnam Policy in the Greater Swedish Cold War Context

What caused Vietnam to become the cause célèbre of the Swedish government? To a significant extent, it was the relative insignificance of Vietnam to Sweden directly. Unlike other Cold War hotspots, Vietnam was able to be used as a pressure valve while not impacting the state's immediate interests. This held true for other issues in the developing world, particularly in regards to national liberation movements. A closer examination of other areas of interest held by Sweden illustrates the relationship between direct insignificance and freedom to act.

The recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam did not represent an overall shift in Swedish interests. This is reaffirmed by the government's unwillingness to recognise the German Democratic Republic (*Deutsche Demokratische Republik,* DDR) despite arguable similarities between North/South Vietnam and East/West Germany. While some feared that a recognition of Hanoi would lead to immediate recognition of East Berlin, it soon became evident that this was not the case as party objectives were subordinate to long term state goals.[103] Unlike in South Vietnam, Swedish economic interests in West

101 Dag Blanck, '"Very Welcome Home Mr. Swanson": Swedish Americans Encounter Homeland Swedes', *American Studies in Scandinavia* (2016), p. 114.
102 Marklund, C., & Petersen, K. (2013). 'Return to sender – American Images of the Nordic Welfare States and Nordic Welfare State Branding,' *European Journal of Scandinavian Studies*, 43(2), pp. 245–257.
103 Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, p. 179.

Germany were substantial, whereas a severing of negligible ties with Saigon in favour of Hanoi would have no meaningful effect on the Swedish economy, something which cannot be said in the case of the two German states. This is made all the more significant when one remembers that both the DRV and the DDR had better claims to recognition, namely by having full control over their territory, than the RVN, with whom Sweden previously had relations, with an ambassador accredited to South Vietnam (though based in Bangkok) until 1967.[104] Even when Sweden chose to recognise the DDR only a couple of years later, it was in a manner fundamentally different than its recognition of the DRV, since the former was a result of, as the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee made clear, the Four Powers (the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) having 'made a joint statement which includes a confirmation that they will support the application for entry into the UN by the two German states.'[105] On the other hand, the recognition of Hanoi was a unilateral decision made by Stockholm without consulting any member of the United Nations Security Council. The unilateral dimension is further affirmed when one considers the fact that Sweden was the first non-communist European state to recognise the DRV. Denmark and Norway waited almost three more years before following suit, with the bulk of Western Europe waiting until the signing of the Paris Peace Accords or Vietnamese reunification.[106]

The primary concern was Swedish interests, including ties with the United States, which as a result often trumped any criticism it may have wished to make. Even in the case of far away countries, the desire for preserved ties with Washington prevailed. For example, the ousting and death of Salvador Allende, the democratically elected leader of Chile, in a US-backed coup, became a prominent issue within the Social Democratic base, with many Chileans coming to Sweden as political refugees as a consequence. Nevertheless, the GOS was not as keen to take up the issue. In fact, the government actively prevented Harald Edelstam, Swedish Ambassador to Chile, from speaking out against Washington's role in the overthrow of Allende.[107] Rather than capitalising on what could have otherwise have been short-term domestic political gains, the government chose instead to prioritise its relationship with the United States. In some cases, the GOS pursued a policy for the sake of enhancing this relationship, even if the components were not ones that Sweden adhered to itself. The most striking example is that of Iceland, which was considering stopping its territory from being used as a base for NATO, and indeed questioned its very

104 Ibid., p. 64.
105 'De fyra stormakterna har dessutom gjort ett gemensamt uttalande innehållande dels en bekräftelse av att de kommer att stödja de två tyska staternas ansökningar om inträde i FN' – Utrikesutskottets betänkande 1972:UU16 – Riksdag.
106 'List of countries which maintains diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam, April 2010 http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/cn_vakv/.
107 Möller, *Sverige och Vietnamkriget*, p. 327.

own membership. Extraordinarily, Palme not only lobbied in private for the Icelanders not to dismantle the American air base at Keflavik, but to also remain in NATO while Sweden remained outside the alliance itself, with the Social Democratic party platform actually calling for continued non-membership in the transatlantic military alliance.[108] Once again, domestic rhetoric took a back seat to worries about the US-Swedish relationship.

The absence of a significant colonial history gave Sweden a unique opportunity to act in the Third World. While Sweden sat on the United Nations Security Council (1975–76), it repeatedly voted against the United States and in favour of the Third World, with the latter itself being more aligned with the Soviet Union. This applied to a whole host of issues, such as voting in favour of a weapons embargo on South Africa, voting in favour of the Angolan government, and supporting PLO participation at the UN.[109] In none of these cases were Swedish national interests directly threatened or even indirectly implicated, which in turn granted the Swedish state, especially under Palme, significant latitude. The Swedish government's attitude to African states in many ways paralleled its conduct vis-à-vis Vietnam. Unlike Southeast Asia, however, Africa proved not to be a hindrance in Swedish-American relations, since local US involvement was in no way comparable to that seen in Indochina. Consequently, Palme was able to go even further and not only meet with heads of states, like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, but also leaders of various national liberation movements, such as Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress and Agostinho Neto of *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*.[110]

The end of the Vietnam War also enabled Sweden to be more engaged, even in areas that were traditionally seen as somewhat sensitive by the United States, with no serious effects on bilateral Swedish-American relations. In 1975, Palme became the first western leader to visit Cuba, where his warm reception by Castro was followed by Sweden sending aid money to build schools on the island while the US embargo was still in effect.[111] That same year, Palme met Kissinger for the first time, where the latter said 'I actually believe our relations have improved.'[112] The reason for this was simple, with Kissinger explaining that 'because we have left Indochina, there is nothing to fight over.'[113] As such, the meeting could be dominated by the subject of Portugal, given its recent revolution, rather than the Third World. In contrast to the Vietnam War, Swedish involvement in the Third World no longer centred itself around American conduct, and with the absence of criticism aimed at the US, tensions reduced considerably.

108 Berggren, *Underbara dagar*, p. 391.
109 Östberg, *När vinden vände*, p. 114.
110 Ibid., p. 108.
111 Ibid., p. 127.
112 'Jag tycker faktiskt att våra relationer har förbättrats.' Ibid., p. 135.
113 'Eftersom vi har lämnat Indokina finns det inget att bråka om.' Ibid., p. 135.

It is worth noting that to some extent Vietnam was not wholly detached from Sweden, which arguably necessitated a response, though not necessarily to the extent that critique was uttered. Though Palme's government ultimately moved to recognise the PRG in the South, the criticism of the US bombing of the North was not fully altruistic but rather was partially within the greater concern of the development of the Cold War, as Chomsky explains:

> [t]he attack on North Vietnam was regarded as an international affair: European governments had Embassies [sic] in Hanoi. Furthermore, the US was bombing internal Chinese railways, which passed through North Vietnam, and was threatening Russian ships and installations in bombing Haiphong harbor and elsewhere. There was concern that it might blow up into a major international conflict.[114]

Therefore, it appears that direct condemnation of US atrocities in South Vietnam was one step too far. To deplore actions in North Vietnam, consequentially, became a viable means of not fully alienating the United States while simultaneously satisfying domestic audiences. This is all the more noteworthy since US atrocities were in fact greater in South Vietnam than in the North in terms of scale and magnitude, as illustrated by the use of chemical weapons as well as the overall scope of the campaign.

6. Significance of the Vietnam Era on Sweden

An exploration of this topic is inherently limited both by the nature of the primary sources as well as the interconnectedness of other issues in regards to US-Swedish bilateral relations. The former can itself be subdivided into a multitude of elements. For example, a closer look at North Vietnamese diplomatic and internal records could shed significant light on this issue, particularly on how close and beneficial, if at all, Swedish criticism and aid was. However, the difficulty in accessing such documents, due to the Vietnamese government having not declassified them as well as the possibility that many of them no longer survive due to the bombing of Hanoi among other reasons, and the lack of translations, renders this perhaps problematic in the short term. Even if such records were to be accessible, one would need to be cautious since North Vietnamese officials often looked to Sweden for a glimpse into the West, thereby possibly making such an examination an exercise in confirmation bias on both the part of the source and the historian.

A complete understanding of the role of the Vietnam War in Swedish-American relations cannot be comprehended in a vacuum. As such, a separate yet complementary analysis

114 Chomsky, Personal Communication – 3 August 2018.

would be necessary to adequately contextualise the importance of Vietnam in relations to other domestic issues. Just as the conflict was weaponised by leading Social Democrats for domestic political gains, so were other matters. For that reason, a comparative analysis of the relative importance of Vietnam to other pressing concerns, such as unemployment, can further one's understanding of how important – or unimportant – Southeast Asia really was on the Swedish political landscape. Similarly, a chronological comparison would be of immense value, contrasting Sweden's pre-1965 behaviour with that which followed. Only by comprehending this can one truly recognise how far the political leadership was willing to push the issue, even if it impacted bilateral ties with a nuclear superpower.

The true impact of Vietnam on Sweden cannot be understood simply through the direct back-and-forth developments in Stockholm and Washington. Rather, these ties should be, and indeed need to be, seen in contrast to their other relationships. What made the United States, for all of its opposition to Swedish actions, still consider Sweden to be part of the so-called 'free world'? These questions become all the more relevant when one considers that the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Hanoi, Minister Podolski, acknowledged how far-reaching Swedish knowledge about Vietnam supposedly was, and proposed information sharing between the two, or when one reads how the Albanian ambassador proclaimed that 'Sweden is the only capitalist country that has understood what is happening in Vietnam.'[115] Such pieces of evidence invite further examination of these other parallel relations, which have the potential to shed further light on Swedish-American ties during this period.

The episode consisting of the years 1965–1975 seems to have been of little long-term consequence in relations between Sweden and the United States. Having once considered implementing sanctions against Sweden, Kissinger would go on to pen and deliver a eulogy for Palme, following his assassination, where he highlighted how the two men developed a personal friendship.[116] Though it may not have made much of a mark in the realm of direct bilateral ties, it has had an effect on post-1975 political debates within Sweden. In what then-foreign minister Carl Bildt called in 2012 'the classic Swedish recognition politics that goes back decades,' Swedish foreign policy, and the push for its implementation, has continued to be a consistent trope.[117] What began with the recognition of the DRV and then subsequently the PRG (though arguably even earlier with the recognition of the People's Republic of China) has had a continued influence all the way through to the present day, whether it was the decision to recognise North Korea in 1973[118], or Palestine in 2014 by

115 Albanian ambassador: 'Sverige är det enda kapitalistiska landet som förstått vad som händer i Vietnam' – Kaj Falkman, *Ekot från Vietnam: En diplomats minnen från kriget och återbesök fyrtio år senare,* Stockholm: Carlsson Bokförlag, 2014, p. 131.

116 Henry Kissinger, 'Olof Palme and I were friends.' *Washington Post* 9 March 1986.

117 'Den klassiska svenska erkännandepolitiken sedan decennier tillbaka.' Carl Bildt, 15 February 2012, Riksdagens protokoll 2011/12:70.

118 'Recognition of North Korea Is Announced by Sweden' *New York Times*, 7 April 1973.

another Social Democratic government.[119] Just as national interests triumphed despite the demands of the party base in the 1970s, so they do still, such as when the governing Social Democrats chose to disregard a parliamentary call for the recognition of Western Sahara.[120]

The significance of the Vietnam War in Sweden really ought to be described as an interest in American involvement in Vietnam. The distinction is subtle, yet very real. While Maoist sympathisers maintained their adherence to the cause, the popular importance of Vietnam (and by extension the United States) in Sweden largely evaporated following the reunification of Vietnam. This is true in light of continued Vietnamese suffering, namely the Cambodian-Vietnamese War of 1978–1989 and the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, neither of which proved to be of any consequence either in Sweden or to its relationship with the United States. None of this should minimise the importance and relevance of neutrality as a component of the Cold War. The existence of a neutral western-leaning *cordon sanitaire* consisting of Sweden (as well as Finland and Austria) enabled a multifaceted relationship that impacted economic, security, and political bonds. As such, Cold War neutrality facilitated a situation that allowed serious (political) disagreements without a fundamental risk to bilateral relations.

It would be useful to understand this period as an example of great power-small state interactions, as well as neutrality/non-alignment during the Cold War. The obvious imbalance of power between the two nations is one that remains and is true vis-à-vis Sweden and the US. Accordingly, one should seek to learn the options and limitations of a small state when it comes to forming an independent foreign policy. This could be understood in a pattern that includes neutral Sweden's wartime relationship to Nazi Germany, but also communist Yugoslavia's path of non-alignment following the Tito-Stalin split. At the same time, historic parallels may not always be of much help, such as when Sweden reversed its policy on deserters in 1991 in fear of a mass influx of Yugoslav combatants, a fear that did not apply to the earlier deserters from the US.[121]

The divergences between the United States and Sweden, when examined through a historical lens that includes Vietnam but also goes beyond it, appear to have remained peripheral in the grand scheme of things. Despite political differences, cooperation has remained steady and indeed strong. Vietnam demonstrated that even under immense political and diplomatic duress, bilateral cooperation below the Cabinet and ambassadorial levels can remain intact. The durability of this bilateral relation, particularly in the military and intelligence dimension, offers the political branch of the government of Sweden significant leeway in terms of rhetorical independence.

119 'Sweden Gives Recognition to Palestinians' *New York Times*, 30 October 2014.
120 Svar på skriftlig fråga 2014/15:481 besvarad av Margot Wallström (S), utrikesminister – Riksdag.
121 Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, p. 137.

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Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies
Vol. 4 Issue 2

Journal of
Autonomy and
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