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Each issue of JASS will include scholarly articles that in some way deal with the subjects mentioned above. Before being accepted, all articles have been subject to a double-blind peer-review process. JASS issues may also include other types of contributions such as project notes, book reviews, and information on pending conferences. JASS is published twice a year – in the late spring and fall.

The editorial board invites articles and other contributions to JASS via the email address submissions@jass.ax and looks forward to proposals on articles, thematic issues, and other suggestions to make JASS a relevant and accessible scholarly journal in its field. It is appreciated if manuscripts sent to us have undergone language editing.

Foreword

Relations between the center and periphery is a classical political, legal and also cultural issue. As any observer of international relations in recent months have noted, these relations have come to the fore in a number of both national and international agendas.

This is true not only for the European continent, but for on-going conflicts in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America which as well are examples of the challenges that states are exposed to, when dealing with actors based on identity interests, not the least when they are expressed as cross-border political forces.

In the Nordic region, the year 2017 has given a reason for a certain form of introspection in relation to the centenary of the Republic of Finland, which at the end of the First World War became independent from the position as a Grand Duchy of Russia. From then on, it was only Iceland that waited for its independence in the Nordic countries, something which was made possible in connection to the next major European War, WWII. Also in this context, the territorial dimensions of identity issues were critical dimensions in the processes that led up to settlements that also hold today.

As the currently ongoing negotiations on a new Autonomy Act illustrates, the autonomy of Åland has been regularly revised and developed during the almost 100 years under which it is has been operative. This has kept the issue both alive and controlled. The autonomy – which in the case of Åland and Finland is part of a larger package of instruments – was at the time of its formation part of a rethinking of a wider international perspective on state formation, self-determination and the creation of a modern state system. The established European system of a balance of power was exposed to ideas of geopolitics and the rights of colonies, peaceful conflict resolution and modern state formation.

Some of these dimensions are treated in detail in this Issue of JASS. It brings together autonomy and security dimensions on a time-line of one hundred years, thus analysing not only a way of thinking one hundred years ago, but also giving an example of how key actors in a center-periphery relation have dealt with the situation, up till today.

Kjell-Åke Nordquist

Editor-in-Chief
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Rethinking the Westphalian Order During WW I:
Max Weber on the Timeliness of the European Polity

Kari Palonen

Abstract

The publication of the *Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe* volumes, including his letters and a recent study of Hinmerk Bruhns, have revised the canonical view on Weber as a German nationalist. With a conceptual and rhetorical analysis of his essays *Deutschland unter europäischen Weltmächten* (1916) and *Zum Thema Kriegsschuld* (early 1919), I offer an alternative view on Weber’s relationship to European politics. He defended the ‘Westphalian’ system of balance between great powers, to which he wanted after the end of the War to incorporate Woodrow Wilson’s plans for a new League. Weber was a critic of German wartime policy, maintained his Anglophile sympathies, and saw in tsarist Russia the main threat both to the balance between powers and also to the European *Kultur*, to which he did oppose barbarism, not the Francophone *Zivilisation*. Weber supported the parliamentarisation of German politics and sketched in the 1919 article a proposal for new regulations of warfare in international law. Although Weber could not imagine the EU’s supra-national Parliament and Commission as new elements in the balance of European powers, it would be plausible to advise, in the Weberian spirit, the small member state to strengthen these supra-nation institutions.

Keywords

Max Weber, European politics, World War I, Westphalian balance of powers, *Kultur* vs. barbarism, international law

1. Introduction

Max Weber’s methodology and political theory are today more pertinent than ever. In contrast, his views on world politics are more strictly bound within the context of his own time. Still, the conceptual apparatus sketched out in his more theoretical writings can be applied to a more detailed interpretation of his analysis of European politics during and just after WWI.

Hinmerk Bruhns has recently published a small book, *Max Weber und der Erste Weltkrieg* (2017). It is a solid work of a historian who extensively uses the recent publications of Weber’s letters and other editions in the *Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe* and therefore alters the received view on Weber. His main interests lie in the ‘factual’ aspects of the events and Weber’s response to them, although including interesting remarks on Weber’s use of language.1 I shall use Bruhns’s work to the purpose of specification of the historical, linguistic and biographical context of Weber’s texts.

I shall provide a conceptual and rhetorical analysis of two texts of Weber. In the wartime essay *Deutschland unter europäischen Weltmächten* (1916) he explicitly presents the European polity as a regime of great powers, claiming that German wartime policy was endangering the delicate order. In a post-war newspaper article *Zum Thema Kriegsschuld*

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2 Bruhns 2017, 166-176.
By contrast, Max Weber, as a thinker of the contingency human activities in terms of temporalisation of language and action, as well as the conceptual apparatus he used in this understanding. These views are related to my long-term profile on the interpretation of Weber’s work.

The analysed writings of Weber further illustrate his attempt to reconceptualise the ‘Westphalian’ order of the European polity, not in the sense of Weber’s family background around Bielefeld, but of the 1648 political momentum. For Weber, the Westphalian order is not based on the sovereign national states, but to the contrary, on the balance between a limited number of great powers to which other countries must adapt their foreign policy. This is also very relevant for today’s discussion in the European Union, to which I shall return in my conclusions.

2. Thinking in terms of Chance

The key concept that gives Weber’s writings their unique profile is Chance, a specific form of contingency that mediates between actions and their relationship to more complex ‘orders and powers’ (Ordnungen und Mächte). For Weber, politics is a contingent and controversial play with time. Chance is no residual concept but the key medium through which contingent human action is rendered intelligible, as opposed to tempering fortuna with virtù, as John Pocock (1975) interprets the ‘Machiavellian Moment.’ This conception of Chance also marks Weberian original interpretation of such concepts as Politik, Macht, Herrschaft and Staat.

Chance is for Weber a formal concept, and includes the chances of catastrophe. Indeed, he is frequently pessimistic in his analysis of the contemporary world, and even assumes that, unless counterweights are applied, the tendency towards bureaucratisation will prevail. Structuralists, systems theorists, and sociologists think in terms of spatial metaphors. By contrast, Max Weber, as a thinker of the contingency human activities in terms of Chance, temporalises the human situation. In this respect his work can be compared with the conceptions of temporalisation of language and action in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre or Reinhard Koselleck. As an action theorist, Weber regards space as frozen time. He analyses historically specific sets of chances in relation to both the historical momentum that has given rise to them and to the limited time frame in which the chances are available.

Weber’s views on time, politics and history are neither evolutionist nor teleological. The concepts of Chance and non-realised ‘objective possibilities’, as opposed to merely thinkable possibilities, are necessary conditions for understanding the realised ones. Unlike for phenomenologists, from Husserl to Koselleck, for Weber what is possible exists thinkable possibilities, are necessary conditions for understanding the realised ones. Weber does not want to be a ‘weather vane’ of developmental tendencies, but he does support the idea of creating procedures and institutions to provide momentum and time-spans for action — even when no chances seem to be left.

Thinking in terms of chances allows Weber to reinterpret the concept of ‘objectivity’ as a fair play procedure for dealing with scholarly controversies. There exists a close link between his 1904 essay on objectivity and his 1918 parliament pamphlet, in particular the pages on the possibilities and forms of parliamentary control of the allegedly superior knowledge of the officials. This vision of objectivity relies on the rhetorical principle of debating in utramque partem and on the Westminster parliamentary procedure as its historical approximation.

3. The polity of European and world powers

Wolfgang J. Mommensen (1959) strongly contributed to canonising the view of Weber as a German nationalist, rightly criticised by Wilhelm Hennis (1987) and others. I join this criticism by claiming that Weber during and after WW1 operated within the framework of an order of great powers, today frequently called the Westphalian regime.

The Chance complexes of which the European polity consists are for Weber not sovereign states but the great powers (Weltemächte). When Weber rejects the pernicious ‘everyday use of the collective concepts’7, he wants the action of great powers to...
be traced back to the individual politicians and their power-shares. The politicians used the specific profile of chances available for the states within the European order. Metonymies such as ‘Germany’ or ‘France’ as actors should be understood precisely in this sense.18

The essay Deutschund unter europäischen Weltmächten (Germany among the European world powers) is a revised version of a speech that Weber gave on 16 October 1916 in Munich at a meeting of the liberal Fortschrittliche Volkspartei.19 The essay is a part of the series of Weber’s contributions against the expansionist and annexationist right-wing agitation in Germany. In this essay more than elsewhere he explicates his views on foreign policy within the regime of world powers.

Weber begins with a self-critical note that in his youth he had supported the expansionist Alldeutscher Verband, but has long since left it.20 He makes the point that those who use the war for domestic political purposes are not ‘national politicians.’21 ‘National’ is here strictly opposed to ‘nationalistic’ and should be understood in relation to Germany’s position as a great power, Machtstaat, in European and world politics.22

Although Weber uses the collective ‘we’ for Germany, this does not prevent him from criticising the German government’s and military leaders’ policies in relation to the European and world order. The smaller states, such as Switzerland or Denmark, are regarded as secondary in world politics.23 However, due to their relationship with the great powers, they are not negligible factors within the European polity. Weber turns with special vehemence against the plans to include conquered Belgium in the German empire.24

For Weber, German foreign policy must be situated to the polity of the competing great powers on which it depends. Being surrounded by three great land powers and one great sea power, Germany’s situation was for Weber more precarious than that of any other country.25 Therefore it was particularly important for its political leaders to avoid vanity (Eitelkeit) and practise a sober (sachlich) foreign policy in accordance with its position among the world powers.26 Weber thus appeals to a political judgment that respects the conditions of the European order between the great powers and, unlike the pan-Germans (Alldeutschen), did not put it at risk. The anglophile Weber was particularly disturbed by their dreams of the destruction (Vernichtung) of Britain as a sea power.27

There are noteworthy differences in Weber’s views on foreign policy and domestic politics. The spoken and written word is the main medium of parliamentary, electoral and party politics.28 Politicians weigh the strengths and weaknesses of alternatives in an open and public debate with the number of votes as the ultima ratio.29 By contrast, diplomatic negotiations are oriented towards compromise between the great powers, similar to the negotiation between old estates.30 In foreign policy, Weber, accordingly, supports the ‘silent’ (schweigend) action31 that would improve the chances for compromise. Similarly, politics as a rhetorical activity should not be confused with the declarative style of the powerless Reichstag, in contrast to the Arbeitsparlament of Westminster, which debates items in detail and where the members participate in the committees which control the administration.32

With his 1916 essay Weber is participating in a public debate on German foreign policy. He avoids declarations for the same reason as he supports parliamentary debates on alternative courses of action, namely, for the possibility of ‘maintaining freedom of choice’ (Erhaltung der Wahlfreiheit). Within the European polity of multiple great powers, this means being careful not to exclude any possible alliances with other great powers, which provocative declarations easily tend to do.33 Diplomacy is also a politics of words, but its aim is to avoid, as Weber quotes Bismarck, ‘breaking the windows’ towards other world powers.34

In his analysis of the political constellation of the ‘Great War’ Weber partly situates himself within the Bismarckian tradition, so militantly he ever criticised the Bismarckian heritage in domestic politics.35 He admits that, due to Bismarck’s politics, an alliance with France was politically impossible after 1871, and this shaped the entire German situation in world politics.36 Weber’s view on maintaining freedom of choice in possible partners in world politics is opposed to having any arch-enemies. He does not share, in the style of Carl Schmitt avant la lettre,37 the view that the political should be marked by decisions based on perceived friends and enemies; instead Weber believes that within the order of powers there should also be intermediate levels of agreement (Verständigung), which is something he strives for in relation to France and Russia.38

18 Weber 1922, 6; 2009, 68–69; see Palonen 2011.
19 For the background and publication, see Mommsen 1988, pp. 383–384, Bruhns 2017, pp. 18-20.
20 Weber 1916a, p. 63.
21 ibid. p. 64.
23 Esp. ibid. 77; see also Weber 1916b.
25 ibid. p. 64.
26 ibid. pp. 64–65.
27 ibid. p. 65.
Weber’s essay, written in the middle of the war, analyses the chances for political alliances, and *modus vivendi* relationships are discussed in view of the prospects for future peace. He is worried over the German wartime policy that could preclude the very possibility of an expedient (*zweckmäßig*) policy after the war,\(^{39}\) and leave unused the time frame that still persists for such a peace. Weber still takes for granted that the Great War will end with a negotiated peace similar to the kind made between the great powers in the wars of the Westphalian era.

Weber’s sober and realistic assessment of the causes of the war is thus not *Realpolitik* à la Bismarck, which he had parodied from his youth; for him, Russia was a threat to the very existence of Germany as a national world power (*gegen unsere Existenz als nationaler Machtstaat überhaupt*). Moreover, the tsarist Russia threatened ‘our entire culture’ (*unsere ganze Kultur*), and even die Weltkultur.\(^{40}\)

### 4. A defence of *Kultur* against the tsarist barbarism

Weber’s 1906 essay *Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Rußland* contains a devastating analysis of the tsarist regime, including a very pessimistic view on the situation of Russian Liberals after the reforms of the 1905 revolution. In the final pages of the 1906 essay Weber offers an eloquent defence of individual freedom of the Western type, as well as of parliamentary and democratic politics.\(^{41}\) This defence was obviously also directed against certain strong tendencies in the German empire. In the 1916 essay Weber enumerates a number of non-Russian peoples having an old and in some respects superior *Kultur* in relation to the Russian empire in which they live.\(^{42}\) Russian hegemony in the world would mean the end not only of the European polity, but also of European *Kultur*, of which tsarist Russia for Weber was never fully a part. The Western powers’ alliance with the tsarist regime was a threat to the chances of *Kultur* both within Russia and in Western Europe.

Here we must notice the special Weberian concept of *Kultur*, which refers to the quality and valuation of something, to the distinction of *Kulturmenschen* from others on a lower level of humanity, as a political judgment based on freedom and choice.\(^{43}\) Unlike, for example, Thomas Mann’s notorious view in his wartime *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (1918), Weber’s concept of the German *Kultur* does not oppose the Western *Zivilisation*.\(^{44}\) In Weber’s wartime polemics, rather, the contrast between civilisation and barbarism is strong, both against tsarist Russia as well as the colonial units in the Western armies.\(^{45}\) All this is connected with another old concept, namely honour (*Ehre*).\(^{46}\)

*A Machtstaat* in the Weberian sense creates chances in world politics, but also limits important chances in domestic politics. Not only in *Kultur* but also in politics, small states have their own value: only in small states, such as Switzerland, is a genuine democracy possible, as well as a genuine aristocracy based on personal trust and leadership.\(^{47}\) In mass states (*Massenstaaten*) the bureaucracy and the military extinguish both, he writes, referring to Jakob Burckhardt.\(^{48}\) However, only the great powers have ‘a responsibility before history’, a duty towards the future of the world, and the freedom of small states is guaranteed only when several great powers are counterposed to each other.\(^{49}\)

With this wartime vision Weber affirms the priority of the great powers as well as their mutual competition as guarantees of the European polity, including the freedom and *Kultur* of the smaller states. He simultaneously indicates the main domestic dangers within a *Machtstaat*, i.e. bureaucratisation and militarisation. Weber in his subsequent writings looks for counterweights for them in the parliamentarisation and democratisation of German politics.\(^{50}\) After the war he sees in the directly elected *Reichspräsident* another counterforce to bureaucratisation, whether within the state or within the parties.\(^{51}\) For him it is not the Swiss type of semi-direct democracy, idealised at that time by many left-wing thinkers, but the British parliamentary system with its culture of debate and its control of government and administration together with a US-type of independent presidency which provide the model for the new political regime in post-war Germany.

The European polity of great powers was for Weber not just a question of expediency. The European polity was, as a product of a past momentum, an alternative to the hegemonic aspirations of *any* of the great powers. It was based on an order that includes the strengths and weaknesses of the greater and smaller powers, and its relationships included intermediate degrees between enmity and alliance. It also created counterweights to the bureaucratisation and militarisation of the great powers. When Weber, most explicitly in his last lectures in spring 1920, analyses the state as a chance complex,\(^{52}\) this allows degrees of stateliness and is incompatible with the traditional view of sovereignty of every state.

For Weber the polity of great powers in 1916 still offers the most viable vision for a more peaceful future co-existence. Instead of a declaration of normative principles or an adaptation to the alleged exigencies of the current constellation, Weber’s analysis operates within a horizon of political actions comprising different types of temporally limited

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39 ibid.
40 ibid. pp. 71-72.
42 Weber 1916a, p. 76.
43 See Weber 1904, 177; also Hennis 1987, Koselleck 1991
45 See Bruhns 2017, pp. 172-176.
46 ibid., pp. 162-167, see Ay 2004.
47 ibid., pp. 76–77.
48 ibid. p. 77.
49 ibid.
50 Weber 1917; 1918b.
51 Weber 1919b.
52 Weber 2009, see Palonen 2011.
chances and their relationships to each other. The chances persisted for a time after the war to maintain the European polity, despite the threat of the annexionist policy of Germany to close them. The Weberian vision of the maintenance of the European order requires their mutual recognition as great powers, regular and active politicking between and within the powers, as well as the consideration of the interests of smaller states.53

5. A proposal for regulating warfare

Against this background it is no wonder that Max Weber, two months after the end of the war and during the initial stages of the democratisation and parliamentarisation of the German polity, took up the topic of the post-war international order. The new German government of Social Democratic chancellor Friedrich Ebert brought an initiative to an international commission on the war guilt on 29 November 1918. Weber, seizing the momentum, wrote the article ‘Zum Thema Kriegsschuld’, which was published in Frankfurter Zeitung, his ‘house newspaper’, on 17 January 1919.54

Already in the weeks following the end of the war, Weber predicted that French generals and not US president Wilson would dominate the peace negotiations,55 and his Versailles experiences in spring 1919 confirmed this pessimism.56 All this has left scholars ignorant of the constructive proposals Weber made for the new League of Nations in January 1919.

Weber’s initial point is to reject the a priori declaration of Germany’s war guilt that allerhand Literaten have declared — elsewhere he mentions pedagogy professor Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster as a prominent exponent of such an attitude.57 For Weber, losing the war should not be confused with the legal question of guilt.58 He declares that on both political and cultural grounds he had always supported an agreement (Verständigung) with England that would have made the war impossible, and he had not changed his main point.59

The point of the Kriegsschuld article is Weber’s insistence that the US president Woodrow Wilson be ready to negotiate with the representatives of Germany and to not impose a ‘forced peace’ (Gewaltfrieden).60 Moreover, Weber sketched a “statute for an international law on war within the League of Nations” (eine Kriegsvölkerrechtsstatut des zu schaffenden Völkerbundes).61 In other words, he not only took seriously Wilson’s proposal as a chance for new momentum based on a ‘League of Nations’, but he also made his own proposals for its statutes regarding the regulation of war. In accordance with the Westphalian order, Weber still regarded war as a part of international politics and he insisted on their regulation by international law within the framework of the new League.62

Weber draws from the experience of the Great War the lesson that stronger legal instruments against war crimes are needed, obviously also in order to reduce the threat of future wars. His statute proposal contains four articles.

The first declares: ‘A state that mobilises for war while negotiations to prevent the war are continuing, shall fall into international disrepute’ (Ein Staat, der mobil macht, während noch verhandelt wird, verfällt dem internationalen Verrat).63 Weber’s claim behind this article is that Russia’s mobilisation in 1914, and with it the entire tsarist system, bears the main responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War.64 Conceptually, the political and legal sanction lies in ‘international disrepute’ of the state in question. The claim is intelligible only within the ‘concert’ of great powers, for the threat then exists that a rule-breaking state may be removed from full ‘membership’ among the respected great powers and be denied a voice in multi-power diplomacy, the main form of political action within the international polity. In other words, the factual status of being a Machtstaat is not by itself sufficient to be a great power; a certain respect for international statutes is also necessary to be recognised as a full participant in the polity of great powers.

The second article reads: ‘A state that at the outbreak of a war does not clearly declare whether it will remain neutral shall fall into international disrepute’ (Ein Staat, der bei Kriegsausbruch auf die Anfrage, ob er neutral bleiben werde, keine deutliche Erklärung abgibt, verfällt dem internationalen Verrat).65 Here the target of criticism is the French policy in 1914.66 The threat is again merely disrepute. In this case, sanctioning might be more difficult to agree upon as a declaration of neutrality leaves more room for interpretation than does mobilisation.

The third article is worded ‘A permanently neutral state can appeal to its neutrality only if it is able to protect itself effectively and equally in every direction’ (Ein dauernd neutralisierter Staat kann sich auf seine Neutralität nur berufen, wenn er sich in den Stand gesetzt hat, sich nach allen Seiten hin gleichmäßig und möglichst wirksam zu schützen).67 Weber mentions Belgium as a small state that had ‘neglected’ its defence in 1914, which appears to be a tacit acceptance of the German attack in 1914. The more general point,

54 See Mommsen 1991a, 163–164; 1991b, 188–189; Bruhns 2017, pp. 82-83.
55 Weber 1918a.
57 Weber 1919a, pp. 80–81, on the revolutionary Bavarian Prime Minister Kurt Eichner, see Bruhns 2017, p 84.
58 Weber 1919c, p. 60.
59 ibid.
60 ibid. p. 61.
61 ibid. p. 62.
62 see also Bruhns 2017, pp. 82-84.
63 Weber 1919c, p. 62.
64 ibid.
66 as Bruhns also notes, 2017, p. 83.
67 Weber 1919c, p. 63.
common to this and the previous article, is that the international war statutes also concern the small states. The target of criticism here is the non-justified use of not shouldering responsibility for one’s own defence, though what degree of defence is sufficient again leaves much room for conflicting interpretations, and it was uncertain how far the great powers would agree on this point.

The fourth article is one that Weber admitted to be a contested principle between the German and the US wartime interpretations, namely, concerning the duties of neutral states. Weber presented the interpretation supported by Germany during the war: ‘A neutral state that tolerates one party’s war crimes without recourse to violent defence, cannot use violence against the other side by appealing to its illegal counter-measures, although they are judged to be the only means to meet the consequences of the enemy’s break of law.’ (Ein Neutraler, der von einer kriegführenden Seite einen Rechtsbruch ohne gewaltsame Abwehr duldet, darf zur Gewaltsamkeit auch gegen die andere Seite nicht greifen wegen solcher rechtswidriger Gegenmaßregeln, welche das einzige Mittel sind, die Folgen des gegnerischen Rechtsbruchs wettzumachen).68 Wilson’s interpretation was that such a link of responsibility does not exist, but must be decided separately (gesondert).69 Weber admits that, with the outcome of the war, Wilson’s legal interpretation has prevailed, but the matter remains controversial. Germany’s policy towards the US was unwise, but not a war crime.70

Max Weber’s proposals for a statute in the international law on war can of course be seen as directed against those who held Germany solely guilty for starting the war. In more general terms, however, they might be seen as an attempt to catch the momentum in which the powers of international law to limit arbitrary acts by great and even small powers was being recognised by the international polity. He admits, however, that due to the absence of any supranational enforcement apparatus ‘international law’ is not directly comparable to state-internal law.71 The sanctions provided in his suggested articles do not, therefore, pose any absolute threats for a great power, but they do increase the political pressure on it.

6. Temporalisation of the Westphalian order

Both of Weber’s writings can be read as situation-specific interpretations of the European polity’s chances and their limits, and the momentum and time frames for change in the context of the Great War. In particular, the four articles of his proposal, understood as conventions to be agreed between the greater and smaller powers in the future League of Nations, were based on the existence of a post-war momentum to create new instruments for the international polity. They aimed at prohibiting certain means of warfare that threatened the League’s constitutive principle as a regime of multiple great powers. In other words, a momentum to incite war or the unjustified use of violence in war would have been made more difficult had all the great powers accepted articles of this kind.

The League as a guardian of the improved international order could not act like a court of law, but was dependent on the politicking between the greater and smaller powers within it. This required both a mutual respect — analogous to the avoidance of ‘unparliamentary language’ — and an increased vigilance among the powers against attempts to resort to violence or create undue advantages over other powers. In this sense the proposed new laws of warfare of the League can also be considered as a step away from secret diplomacy and towards a more procedural order, or towards a more parliamentary European and world-wide polity.

The Hague peace conferences of 1899 and 1907 contain signs of a parliamentarisation of foreign policy72 interrupted by the war. Weber was convinced that in foreign policy the British parliamentary regime was superior to the German rule of officialdom (Beamtenherrschaft) in foreign policy.73 It remains open whether he saw a more parliamentary-style diplomacy possible.

A closer look at Weber’s two essays makes visible the temporal subtext of their politics. The proceduralisation of how war may be initiated and conducted involves temporalisation, similarly to the proceduralisation and temporalisation of disputes in parliamentary politics.74 This is directly connected to the situation that there exists no neutral and supra-political instance that could immediately judge, whether statutes have been violated, for the ‘facts’ are matters of interpretation, as in ordinary juridical cases.75

Within a European polity based on agreements between great powers, if one of the powers raises the charge that another power has violated the rules this implicitly requires the participants to adjourn the question in order to interpret at a later moment the allegation and the possible measures. This interruption gives the participants in the European polity both the momentum and the time-span to judge whether a violation has taken place. Such a demand for a ‘timeout’ by itself serves as a major means of weakening or neutralising the threat of hostilities.

Of course, the content of Weber’s essays in their broad outlines is perhaps not so different from those of other German moderate academics of the time. My textual analysis, however, directs attention to Weber’s formulations, which illustrate his distinct manner.

68 ibid. p. 64.
69 ibid.
70 ibid. pp. 64–65.
71 Weber 1922, p. 18.
72 See Leinen and Bummel 2017, pp. 34–50; Roshchin 2017.
73 Weber 1918b, pp. 248–258.
74 See Palonen 2014a, chapters 5–6.
75 on the different types of legal disputes and their rhetoric, see Skinner 2014.
of thinking. Though these writings are addressed to a wide non-academic audience, they are nonetheless important for understanding the distinct vocabulary and rhetorical characteristics of Weber’s style of thinking politically.

It is possible that we can also draw lessons from Weber in the contemporary debates on the European Union. The supra-national EU institutions, in particular the European Parliament and the European Commission, bring to the present-day politics an element that transcends the Westphalian-type balance of powers regime, or at least sets limits to the maneuverings of the great powers, both within and outside the EU. Those member states that want to stick to their ‘sovereignty’, such as Hungary or Poland, or to rely on the intergovernmental institutions, such as Sweden, are historically remnants of ancient empires. In this situation, however, as the former Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen well understood, the interest of the small member states lies in the strengthening of the EU’s supra-national institutions.

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Book review of Peter N. Stearns (ed.) “Demilitarization in the Contemporary World”, University of Illinois Press (2013)

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Book reviews are often written when a book has very recently appeared. While it is now nearly four years since this edited volume appeared, the review argues that the book deserves continued attention and discussion and that it can function as a source of inspiration for many years to come. There are many reasons for this assertion. Firstly, as argued by the editor of the book, ‘[d]emilitarization merits both renewed attention and wide assessment as a significant, if still somewhat unexpected, facet of contemporary world history’ (p. 250). Secondly, the book indeed makes such a ‘wide assessment’, as it gathers several important contributions which address issues of demilitarization from the historical, sociological, international relations and political perspectives. Thirdly, the volume makes an important theoretical and conceptual choice in looking primarily at state-wide regimes of demilitarization, with a clear focus on Germany and Japan after the Second World War, in addition to several thought-provoking contributions on Central and Latin America. Finally, several of the contributions offer unique insights into the history and past and present-day politics of countries holding varying positions of importance in the contemporary world.

In addition to the introduction and the afterword written by the editor of the volume, professor of history Peter Stearns, we find four sections dedicated to: conceptual, sociological and historical perspectives (Chapter 1 by Andrew Bickford); demilitarization in Germany in two chapters (Chapter 2 by Jay Lockenour and Chapter 3 by Holger Nehring); demilitarization in Japan (Chapters 4-7 written respectively by Yoneyuki Sugita, Glenn Hook, Christopher Hughes and Stephanie Trombley Averill); and, finally, the fourth section of the book which deals with Central America and especially the case of Costa Rica in a comparative and contradistinctive mode (Chapter 8 on Costa Rica and Honduras

1 Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Associate Professor of International Law, Head of Research in the project ‘Demilitarisation in an increasingly militarised world. International perspectives in a multilevel framework – The case of the Åland Islands’. The project is a cooperation between the Åland Islands Peace Institute and the University of Lapland (Rovaniemi, Finland). It is funded mainly by the Kone Foundation. For more information, see: http://www.peace.ax/en/research/research-projects
by Kirk Bowman, and Chapter 9 on the role of a pendulum between militarization and demilitarization in the Central American Civil Wars by Philip J. Williams and J. Mark Ruhl).

The book is meant to compensate for the fact that 'history tends to privilege war and war makers' while less attention is paid by historians in general to 'commitment to peace or innovations that seek peace' and 'peace history', unless, 'of course, like the famous Pax Romana, they depend on a strong military infrastructure' (p. 2). Reference is then made to international law and Oppenheim's work from 1906 defining demilitarization on the basis of agreement between states and the fact that 'anachronistically, demilitarization may refer to recurrent practice by states that are victorious in war to require a reduction in military capacity from their defeated rival without any regional specifications' (p. 3). Many of the cases explored are, indeed, country-wide imposed demilitarization regimes coupled to strong presence by the armed forces of the victorious powers, in this case the United States. In this sense, there is no anachronism occurring when the notion of demilitarization is employed in these cases, but rather an expansion and deepening of imposed militarization regimes. Such expansion and deepening have a profound impact not only upon military presence and capacity as such, but also on the constitutional profile as well as the fundamental political choices of the countries and regions concerned. This account of countrywide effects of demilitarization follows the lines of an encompassing conceptualisation of the demilitarization–militarization continuum as offered by Bickford in a previous chapter of the book. Imposed demilitarization can be coupled with imposed militarization affecting the 'desired forms and visions of the state and the moral universe of the state', argues Bickford (p. 23).

One of the intriguing, but tacit, themes of the book is the difficulty to draw a clear line between imposition and choice in the cases studied. Not only is there often at play an entanglement of political, historical, military, legal and economic aspects, as amply illustrated by Kirk Bowman's discussion of the case of the 1957 constitutional reform and elections in Honduras. There is also the contingency and complexity of self-perceptions, identity formation processes and the role of civil society, as in the case of Germany, illustrated in three distinct chapters (respectively by Bickford, Lockenour and Nehring) as well as in a more comparative chapter looking at the linkages between demilitarization and democratization (Trombley Averill). This link is also an important element in the analysis on El Salvador and Guatemala by Williams and Ruhl. While the armed forces dominated political life in these countries for much of the 20th century, demilitarizing processes were part of the peace accords negotiated and monitored by the United Nations, for example with a multilateral involvement which ended the civil wars (p. 239).

The role of multilateral involvement is otherwise not much discussed in the book; one obvious possibility would, for instance, have been with regard to the role of NATO in Germany, including the discourses and processes leading first to NATO membership for West Germany in 1955 and then to the expansion of the geographical scope of that membership by including East Germany in 1990. This is, by necessity, only marginally mentioned in the chapter by Nehring, who focuses on the roles of peace movements in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s.

Only the case of Costa Rica, an exceptional case – all the more so since it was located within the remit of the US Monroe doctrine – deviates from this paradigmatic understanding of what demilitarization is all about, either as the outcome of agreement or as an imposed regime. Demilitarization is most often treated as a deviation from a paradigm; the paradigm, which is also an intersubjective belief, that strong militaries have always been there and are 'necessary and normal' (Bowman, p. 209). For example, Costa Rica initiated its constitutional self-proclaimed demilitarization in 1948 through a unilateral act, behind which, we learn, are found complex factors and processes.

Several of the chapters make materials and knowledge that is otherwise difficult to obtain available to the wider public. Yoneyuki Sugita gives a fascinating account of the multiple stages and contradictions of US-Japanese relations in the aftermath of World War II. The interviews used as empirical materials in the case of Costa Rica and in Germany, including East Germany (by Bowman and Bickford respectively) offer us insights which can hardly be obtained through other research methodologies. Max, a former East German army artillery officer, described the enduring experience in an interview conducted in 1999, almost a decade after the reunification of Germany: 'Whenever I go on vacation, I still study the lay of the land, where the hills and trees are, and try to decide where I would place my artillery battery, where I would place my observation post, and where I would place my command post. I still think this way, and I can't help it' (p. 27).

Several of the contributions in the book address the constitutional role of the military and of the legal and political relation between what is military and what is civilian. Constituitional revisions and innovations are recurring themes in the book and evolve often along the tensions shaped by the relationship between domestic legislative processes on the one hand and international involvement and international law on the other (see the insightful discussion on the Japanese constitution and its interpretation by Hughes).

Surprising connections appear for the reader, as when Philip C. Jessup, now known as a great American international lawyer and adviser during the Bretton Woods negotiations, then US ambassador-at-large in Japan, argued in 1949, so during the time of the occupation of Japan by the allies, that the establishment of US bases in Japan would be 'politically acceptable if Japan asked the United States to retain US security forces' (p. 92). Issues of speed and timing are crucial throughout the analysed examples of militarization and demilitarization.
The editor of the book offers in the afterword the outline of possible future research agendas. He argues for three main possible tracks (pp. 249-250). Continuity and change in the different countries and parts of the world need to be monitored and discussed regularly. Comparison of cases is another needed methodology to this effect. Finally, increased attention to the geography of demilitarization is the final analytical track identified by professor Stearns. Those are the tracks prioritised by a historian, but there are many other possibilities and arguments to deduct from the book.

The role of law in general, and of constitutions in particular, in efforts of demilitarization/militarization becomes clear to the reader in many of the book chapters. Future deepened analysis would need to have such an agenda explicitly outlined and bring together lawyers and social scientists from many other disciplines. Historically informed and comparative constitutional history is becoming an increasingly urgent project for us to understand and reflect upon the conditions and contingencies of democratization and the role of the military-civilian nexus in it. Deepened conceptual analysis of what is ‘military’ and what is ‘civilian’ and their many links to power, law and the idea of sovereignty could open new avenues allowing for future remoulding of this idea of sovereignty and move us beyond ‘heteronomy’, as has been argued by Dieter Grimm.2

Furthermore, analysis of the processes, actors and effects of the early years after the second World War, leading to the chilling effects of the Cold War, becomes a priority as the generations who lived through these periods of history are growing older, but their experiences and efforts have not always been passed over to younger generations. Cold War studies are now becoming common features in various academic institutions, and should encompass the demilitarization-militarization-democratization dimension. Finally, while this volume focuses on state-wide militarization-demilitarization trajectories, it is argued that limited geographic demilitarization, today often situated on islands, such as in Svalbard/Spitzbergen, the Åland Islands, or in the Ionian and Aegean seas, while limited geographically, have equally profound effects in the mind-sets, politics and legal universes of the countries concerned.

What is an essential conclusion of the book is formulated by Peter Stearns in the afterword: ‘[D]emilitarization in recent history involves significant and deliberate innovation’ (p. 249). The same obviously holds true for the opposite, militarization, too. As we learn through the book, while underlying factors can evolve slowly and barely perceptively, the implementation of radical changes can occur with great speed.

Research Note:
Mackinder, Westermarck and the Åland Question

Heidi Öst

Keywords
Aaland, Åbo Akademi, Åland, Åland Question, Fenno-scandia, Finland, Geopolitics, Lenin, London School of Economics, Mackinder, Walter Rhode, Westermarck, WWI

1. Introduction
In the wake of last year’s award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos for his efforts to bring the country’s more than 50-year-long civil war to an end, the words of another Colombian Nobel Prize winner sprung to mind. Upon receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1982, Gabriel García Márquez lectured on the solitude of Latin America. The crux of that solitude being, he explained, the lack of conventional means to render the lives of some on the continent believable. Lives reflected, one may assume, through the characters in his famous novel from 1967, One Hundred Years of Solitude, members of the Buendía family in the fictive Macondo.

In Finland, 2017 has been a year of recollection. The anniversary of one hundred years of Finnish independence has spurred a buzz of conversations and events that have brought to life in the minds of many more or less legendary or forgotten figures from the past. One of my personal favourites is the police officer Walter Rohde, who in the island of Pargas outside Finland’s former capital Åbo (Turku in Finnish) in 1907 is supposed to have assisted Lenin finding a horse in his escape from the country only to later be shot three times in the head by red revolutionaries during the Finnish civil war. Are we not haunted, like the villagers in Macondo, by ghosts?

1 The author, Heidi Öst, is in the final stage of her doctoral studies in Public Law at Åbo Akademi University, where she is finalizing her thesis which concerns citizenship and voting rights in four autonomous areas, with Åland as one of the case studies. Previously she has also studies Global Politics at Keele University and has done research for the Åland Islands Peace Institute. Currently she is also acting as the mediation officer at the Peace institute’s Åland Mediation office.

On the anniversary year of one hundred years of Finnish independence, it seems appropriate to initiate an examination of the role played by Edvard Westermarck in the Åland settlement and the extent to which, if any, it was influenced by the geopolitical outlook of Sir Halford Mackinder. Edvard Westermarck was the first rector of the resurrected Swedish-language academy in Åbo (the present Åbo Akademi University, hereinafter referred to as Åbo Academy in this work), and had acted prior to this both as professor of sociology in London School of Economics (LSE) and of practical philosophy in Helsinki University.

Westermarck represented the Swedish Assembly of Finland in the League of Nations when the question of the status of the islands was discussed. Westermarck’s time at the LSE links him to Sir Halford Mackinder, director of the LSE between 1903 and 1908, and thus to a certain geopolitical outlook shaped by Mackinder, which has had tremendous influence over foreign policy discourse during the last century. Given that these two prominent LSE pioneers were active several years in the same academic community, one may ask whether Westermarck was influenced by Mackinder’s world view and/or vice versa?

In the following, I will first revisit the views presented by Mackinder in one of his most famous lectures. I will then examine Westermarck’s time at the LSE, with the view to identify potential points of connection with Mackinder. Finally I will turn to the Åland Islands question and examine what Westermarck himself has remarked about his involvement in the issue.

2. Mackinder’s mapping of the world

Mackinder was a student of Oxford University with an affinity for maps, who had visited Harvard, Princeton and John Hopkins to inquire about their geographical teaching in 1882. Later on, as the president of the geography section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Mackinder argued for the establishment of a school of geography. He was eventually made Director of the first School of Geography at Oxford in 1899. He was also interested in economic and military strategy. Mackinder taught at the LSE, founded by the socialist Fabian society in 1895, more or less from the start, and in 1903 he was appointed Director.

He proceeded with an analysis of European political divisions throughout history, but then shifted viewpoint to consider what he called “the Old World in its entirety.” He noted that two-thirds of the world’s population was “concentrated in relatively small areas along the margins of the great continent” and then, with reference to the Mongolian expansion of the mid-14th century, that “all the settled margins of the Old World sooner or later felt the expansive force of mobile power originating from the steppe.” He spoke of the Eurasian steppe as the heart of Asia, surrounded as he saw it to the east, south and west by marginal regions, ranged in a vast crescent, accessible to shipmen. The natural rivalry of the mobility of the hordes of the steppe was according to Mackinder the mobility offered by navigation over oceans and oceanic rivers. To illustrate what he saw as the world’s competing natural seats of power, Mackinder provided the following Mercator-projection:

In “The Geographical Pivot of History”, which Mackinder read to the Royal Geographical Society on 25 January 1904, Mackinder outlined a theory that later has become known as the Heartland Theory. When the lecture commenced Mackinder captured the moment in the passing of time:

“When historians in the remote future come to look back on the group of centuries through which we are now passing, as we to-day see Egyptian dynasties, it may well be that they will describe the last 400 years as the Columbia epoch, and will say it ended soon after 1900.”

He proceeded with an analysis of European political divisions throughout history, but then shifted viewpoint to consider what he called “the Old World in its entirety.” He noted that two-thirds of the world’s population was “concentrated in relatively small areas along the margins of the great continent” and then, with reference to the Mongolian expansion of the mid-14th century, that “all the settled margins of the Old World sooner or later felt the expansive force of mobile power originating from the steppe.” He spoke of the Eurasian steppe as the heart of Asia, surrounded as he saw it to the east, south and west by marginal regions, ranged in a vast crescent, accessible to shipmen. The natural rivalry of the mobility of the hordes of the steppe was according to Mackinder the mobility offered by navigation over oceans and oceanic rivers. To illustrate what he saw as the world’s competing natural seats of power, Mackinder provided the following Mercator-projection:

23, no. 4, April 1904,
Like all maps, Mackinder’s map is an approximation of reality, and as all Mercator-projections, it distorts the size of objects as the latitude increases from the Equator to the poles, so that Greenland appears to be as large as or even larger than Australia, when in fact Australia is more than three and a half times as large as Greenland. In 1885, a Scottish clergyman named James Gall had published a paper on the use of cylindrical projections for geographical, astronomical and scientific purposes, a method revived in the early 1970’s by Arno Peters.13 As an illustrative comparison to Mackinder’s map, the Gall-Peters projection, which maps all areas according to their actual size relative to each other, is provided below:14

The reasons for which Mackinder illustrated his thesis with a Mercator-projection and not made any mentioning of Gall’s work are not known to the present author. Can it be that Mackinder, given his strong historical interest, simply had failed to take note of Gall’s projections and therefore ignored them? Why did he otherwise choose the centuries-old Mercator-projection? Today, when we have more sophisticated tools to help us navigate in the world, Mackinder’s mapping of the world may seem deeply flawed and Eurocentric, and even unimaginative when contrasted with the work of Gall from the same period. In 1954 however Mackinder was credited by Kruszewski with having “boldly shifted the conventional European centre and showed the Americas on the edge of each side of Africa, Europe and Asia”.15 In his strive to consider “the Old World in its entirety” Mackinder did in fact move Europe, if only slightly, from its traditional position in the middle of the world map.

Mackinder’s lecture on the geographical pivot of history proceeded by asking whether the heartland of Eurasia was not “the pivot region of the world's politics” also at the moment of his lecturing, when it was about to be covered by a network of railways: “Russia replaces the Mongol empire. Her pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Turkey, on Persia, on India, and on China, replaces the centrifugal raids of the steppemen”.17 As the lecture was about to end, he elaborated on the perceived threat from Russia and presented a strategic response:

“The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. This might happen if Germany was to ally herself with Russia. The threat of such an event should, therefore, throw France into alliance with the over-sea powers, and France, Italy, Egypt, India and Corea would become so many bridge heads where the outside navies would support armies to compel the pivot allies to deploy land forces and prevent them from concentrating their whole strength on fleets.”18

Curiously, Mackinder in the end linked the general threat he perceived globally from the “pivot region” to a specific European scenario – that of Germany allying herself with Russia – which he implied might set the scene for a Russian/German empire of the world. The rest, as the saying goes, is history.

3. The connection between Mackinder and Westermarck

The year after Mackinder had been made Director of the LSE and the same year as he had read ”The Geographical Pivot of History” to the Royal Geographical Society, Edvard Westermarck was appointed as a lector in sociology at the LSE.19 According to Westermarck, he was approached originally in 1903 with an invitation to take part in the setting up of a sociological society sponsored by a Scottish former member of the lower chamber of the British parliament, Martin White, and later invited by the University in

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13 James Gall, "Use of cylindrical projections for geographical, astronomical, and scientific purposes". Scottish Geographical Magazine 1 (4) 1885, 119–123.
15 Kruszewski, 1954.
16 Mackinder, 1904, p. 434.
17 Id., p. 436.
18 Mackinder, 1904, p. 436.
London to lecture on sociology at the School of Economics and Politics. The donor’s aim was to fill a gap in the education of future parliamentarians in sociology. Westermarck’s audience was small in the beginning, but Martin White was patient and would regularly attend the last seminar of term himself. Westermarck was promoted to professor in sociology at LSE in 1907.

It seems fair to assume that Mackinder and Westermarck not only were in contact with one another, but that their relationship likely was one of mutual inspiration and interest. Besides Westermarck’s Finnish background, the anthropological research that Westermarck had conducted in Morocco in 1898 could have been noted by Mackinder, who himself led an expedition up Mount Kenya in 1899. Both Westermarck and Mackinder did at some point attend social events organized by members of the socialist Fabian society such as an expedition up Mount Kenya in 1899. The Fabian Society in London was set up on 20th of November 1903 and the first lecture meeting was held on the 18th of April 1904, where Westermarck lectured on the position of women in early civilization. See id., p. 71. Mackinder was a member of the Coefficients dining club that the Webb’s founded in 1902. See Catalogue of LSE Library’s archive holdings, https://archives.lse.ac.uk/Record.aspx?src=CalmView. Catalog&id=ASSOC+17&pos=1 (visited 15 November 2017).

Westermarck's biography mentions dinner and evening parties at Sidney Webb’s. Id., p. 38, 263. Mackinder was a member of the Coefficients dining club that the Webb’s founded in 1902. See Id., p. 254.

Westermarck's biography does not however mention Mackinder, though the chapter on English acquaintances notes that Martin White introduced Westermarck to Lloyd George. In Finland, the anti-Russian feeling had spilled over in deadly violence when Eugene Schauman shot governor Bobrikov in the Finnish Senate in the summer of 1904. According to Westermarck, he read the news in Geneva, where he had gone for an excursion. In October 1904, as Westermarck started lecturing at the LSE, the so-called Doggerbank incident, in which Russian warships on their way to the Far East attacked fishing vessels in the North Sea, seriously disrupted the relations between Russia and Britain. Westermarck spent the autumn and the following spring in London and travelled back to Finland only in the autumn of 1905. He was called as professor of practical philosophy at Helsinki University in 1906, but spent both the spring terms of 1906 and 1907 in London. After the Finnish declaration of independence in December 1917 and the ensuing civil war, Åbo Academy was founded in 1918, and Westermarck was appointed professor in philosophy and elected rector there. At this point he left Helsinki University, but remained a professor of LSE and continued to serve as such until 1930.

4. Westermarck and the Åland Islands settlement

Following the civil war, when Westermarck and others were engaged in re-establishing the Åbo Academy, a constituent assembly was set up in the Åland Islands. The doctrine of self-determination and the ongoing struggles over this concept in the Polish border areas had caught the islanders’ attention. The Åland assembly and the Swedish government pleaded that the question of the future status of the islands would be discussed during the peace conference in Paris.

During 1919, the world was focused on Paris, where the six-months long peace conference came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in the summer of 1919. The question of the status of the Åland Islands was discussed by the Baltic Sea section of the conference, but eventually the question was transferred to the Council of the League of Nations. Westermarck, who presided over the opening of the Åbo Academy 11-12 October 1919, now intervened. In a piece called the Aaland Question in The Contemporary Review, Westermarck addressed what the Council of the League of Nations had to decide upon in 1920. The article sums up Westermarck’s view before the negotiations and forcefully argues that the Åland Islands belongs to Finland. The arguments laid forth by Westermarck refer the need to take account not only of the Swedish-speakers on Åland, but also of those living elsewhere in Finland, and portray the Åland population as a subset of the larger Swedish-speaking minority in Finland. In the grand scheme of things, strengthening the influence of Scandinavian culture in the region was, argued Westermarck, linked to the strive for maintenance of peace, a more important consideration than that of fulfilling the wishes and hopes of the people of the Åland Islands to be reunited with Sweden:

Further research is required to establish exactly to what extent, if any, Mackinder’s world view influenced Westermarck and/or vice versa. To answer this question, one would at least need to manage a thorough reading of both these two productive gentlemen’s many volumes, as well as of all the literature surrounding these two personalities. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to access all the relevant literature in time for this manuscript. In the next section the involvement of Westermarck with the question of the status of the Åland Islands will be examined.

Id., p. 267.

Id., pp. 251-252.

Rolf Lagerborg, 1951, p. 57. The Sociological Society in London was set up on 20th of November 1903 and the first lecture meeting was held on the 18th of April 1904, where Westermarck lectured on the position of women in early civilization. See id., p. 71.

The Council of the League of Nations desires by its settlement of the question of the Aaland Islands "to establish conditions favourable to the maintenance of peace in that part of the world." We cannot conceive that, if the Aaland Islands continued to remain under the sovereignty of Finland, Sweden would make an attempt to conquer them or support an armed rebellion on the islands.


26 Rolf Lagerborg, 1951, p. 75-76.

25 Id., p. 254.

23 Westermarck’s biography mentions dinner and evening parties at Sidney Webb’s. Id., p. 38, 263.

22 Id., p. 254.

21 Edvard Westermarck, Minnen ur mitt liv, p. 252.


24 Edvard Westermarck, Minnen ur mitt liv, p. 267.

25 Id., pp. 251-252.
If, on the other hand, Finland in some way or other were compelled to cede Åland to Sweden, there is the danger that Finland may in the future look for the assistance of some mighty ally on the Baltic to regain the territory torn from her. As a native of Finland and a sincere friend of Sweden, I hope that such a danger will never arise. I trust that the Council of the League of Nations will find some recommendation which, instead of alienating the two countries from each other, will bring them closer together and make them friends and allies.29

In the very end, Westermarck seems to echo Mackinder, when he provides a direct reference to "a Fenno-Scandia spoken of by geographers"30, which, he claims, ought to be matched by a political Fenno-Scandia: "As friends with common aims, the four small nations of the North may form a political combination of importance on the shores of the Baltic."31 Would Westermarck ever have written this were it not for Mackinder? In his biography, Westermarck recalls that he made a visit to Lord Bryce to hear his opinion with respect to the Åland question.32 Lord Bryce was at the time 83 years old, of good vigour, and "naturally completely on our side" writes Westermarck.

As mentioned in the introduction, Westermarck represented the Swedish Assembly of Finland to the League of Nations in 1920-21 when discussions were scheduled to take place concerning the status of the Åland Islands. Due to his absence from Åbo Academy, the Academy appointed another head during this time.33 Upon his return, Westermarck spoke about the negotiations at a social gathering of the student union of the Academy. His speech was published in the Finnish Swedish-language daily Hufvudstadsbladet 21 October 1921.34 Before the members of the student union of the Åbo Academy, Westermarck noted that the Åland question contained elements that ought to be forgotten as quickly as possible, as errors had been committed on both sides.

5. Conclusion

On the anniversary year of one hundred years of Finnish independence, are we not yet ready to examine the role played by Edvard Westermarck in the Åland settlement and the extent to which, if any, it was influenced by the geopolitical outlook of Sir Halford Mackinder? This research note first revisited Mackinder’s world-view and the arguments he presented in his 1904 lecture on the geographical pivot of history. It then proceeded to examine the connection between Mackinder and Edvard Westermarck. The sources suggest that the relationship between Mackinder and Westermarck was one of mutual inspiration and interest. However, Westermarck makes no mentioning of Mackinder in his biography. Further research is necessary to better understand their relationship and to what extent they influenced one another. Finally, the involvement of Westermarck in the Åland question was examined. It is another area where additional research may reveal new details. Within the restraints of this piece of research however, Westermarck’s intervention in the Åland question seems to have been motivated by political ambitions in line with those of Mackinder. Perhaps by the one hundred years anniversary of the autonomy of the Åland Islands we will know a little more.
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Daniel R. Strebe, The world on Gall–Peters projection. 15° graticule. Imagery is a derivative of NASA's Blue Marble summer month composite with oceans lightened to enhance legibility and contrast. Image created with the Geocart map projection software. Created on 15 August 2011. Copyright: Creative Commons, some rights reserved (CC BY-SA 3.0). Available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gall–Peters_projection_SW.jpg
When I was elected a member of the County Assembly of Åland for the first time in 1979, Åland, and the world - of course - looked quite different from today. The logic of the Cold War ruled the world. The welfare state was under development and the times were favourable to the so-called Nordic model. An international student revolt in the late 1960s led to an increased interest in the third world, gender equality and citizen-driven peace work. The Soviet Union and the U.S.A. threatened each other with increasingly dangerous nuclear weapons. The Nordic countries rejected all proposals for nuclear weapons deployment in their territories. Instead, there was growing popular demand for a nuclear-free Nordic region. In this context, international attention was directed at Åland and its unique status as a demilitarised and neutralised area. Legal scholars were soon to notice that Åland is also a nuclear-free zone according to international law. All of a sudden Åland became an important symbol for many in the European peace movement of the 1980s. This came as a surprise to the Ålandic elite, who did not quite know how to deal with the issue. The peace movement was seen by many as a subversive activity that deceptively served the Soviet Union and communism. When the Åland Institute of Peace began its activities in 1992, it did so with the silent consent of the political establishment. The financial support from the Åland Government was very modest.
How has the Ålandic community since then been perceiving peace work? And how have the Ålanders viewed their own international role - based on the entity’s unique status as a demilitarised and neutralised region in northern Europe? Because of its strategic position, Åland functions at all times as a security barometer for the level of political tension in this part of the world.

The title of my speech “From Islander to Ålander” requires a brief historical retrospect. My starting point is still the year 1979. At that time, political life in Åland was very old-fashioned. The party system was just about to stabilise. There was only one single newspaper, which dominated not only as the leading form of mass media, but also as the leading voice of autonomy, and in the spirit of Julius Sundblom to a large extent set the agenda on popular opinion. How and who could act as the voice of Åland was largely decided at this time by the editorial board of the newspaper Tidningen Åland.\footnote{Parliamentary rule had not been introduced – rather, the county assembly often functioned like a municipal council, where rival regional interests were driven by strong personalities who, with the help of temporary majorities, forced their agenda by using threats and compliments. The power struggle was a question of the hegemony of the city or the countryside. The interests of the archipelago were protected by the existing Autonomy Act, and during this time the services in the archipelago were strongly developed by ferries, roads, bridges, banks and regional archipelago support.}

The external threat was absolute; Helsinki as the capital was untouched and disinterested, and consistently avoided following the Åland Agreement and the intention of the Autonomy Act. A kind of cold war was reflected in the relationship between Åland and Finland, and with a clear common enemy; an Ålandic identity was spelled out, which can be described as a political community - an envisaged Ålandishness.

At this time, the Patriarchy was a dominating factor. The term ‘identity’ was barely invented and an intersectional identity was an implausible thought at the time. The rhetorics of self-government politics contained terms such as particularity, social balance, the special relationship of the region and secluded position, and other similar expressions that emphasised the deviating living conditions of the area and region. In this discourse, women and other marginalised groups were missing. The female experience was manifested in the literary world and gained its idiomatic expression in the work “Stormskärs-Maja” whose persona and life were captured by Vårdö-dweller Anni Blomqvist. Decades earlier, in 1936, the Vårdö native Sally Salminen released her debut novel “Katrina”. The two novel characters have common features and lifestyles, but differ in such a way that Katrina takes on the struggle against class society while Maja relies on the power and comfort of religion. In a strong patriarchal society, it is assumed that Maja appears to be a true female, because she does not impose any political or other claims on her own rights but subordinates, albeit reluctantly.

From 1917 until the mid-1980s, the self-image of the Ålanders was shaped by the Sundblom leadership’s aspirations to seek reunification with Sweden. The Sundblom leadership wanted to depart from the system of self-governance as a foundation for its own particular identity and social structure. Through this transformation, Sundblom’s role shifted from a campaigner for reunification to the one who initiated autonomy. An impressive political changing of stripes.

It is intriguing to see how the rhetoric of reunification shifted, and from the 1950s onwards it gradually moved towards an increasingly nationalistic ideology of autonomy. The Reunification movement was almost swallowed up by the desire for romantic nationalism. Åland, the lost child, would finally be reunited with the tribe and Mother Svea would cradle and protect Åland in her powerful bosom once and for all. Åland and Sweden were eternally bound by the Swedish language and the Swedish heritage. This gave rise to a growing acute awareness of the Swedish language and common Swedish roots as irreplaceable values for the creation of an Ålandic identity. The gravity of this conviction is illustrated by an archeological dispute over whether the first inhabitants of Åland came from the west or the east. Another example of the thorniness of this question is the dispute over place names, which was taken with utmost seriousness.

After a somewhat lengthy political recovery as a consequence of the decision by the League of Nations, there followed a development of self-governing policy which resulted in an Ålandic rhetoric and identity. This was reinforced by the fact that economically and socially, Åland was developing in a highly positive manner. In almost all areas of society, successes to large and small extents are evident. The self-image of the Ålanders thrived and the belief in their own capabilities was strengthened. Visions of independence were formed among the most brazen.

In parallel to this development, society and politics were becoming more diversified. The media landscape flourished, the political party system was stable, the civil participation of women expanded, the parliamentary system was introduced, the level of education rose and levels of inward migration increased. This resulted in an Åland which progressively became characterised by diversity and a certain degree of modernity. The Ålanders had created a well-functioning society and a strong identity by the time the bells chimed for the new millennium.

Nowadays, an Ålandic identity is one which must be considered from an international perspective. The time is now long gone when the newspaper Tidningen Åland took the

\footnote{Since 1991 it is Ålands landskapsregering, which could be translated into ‘County Government of Åland’, but mostly translates to ‘Government of Åland’. Whereas ‘styrelse’ can be translated to administration, ‘regering’ literally means government. See Stephan 2011, pp. 37-38.}

\footnote{Also known as Ålandstidningen i.e. the newspaper of Åland.}
liberty of determining who was a “real” Ålander, who was not considered an Ålander, who was an ex-Ålander, or simply a citizen who due to his or her opinions would be ostracised, ridiculed or condemned. In the same way, the political parties and society in general have accepted that diversity and respecting other opinions are essential values, and these values also apply to Åland. To be Ålandic today is not solely a question of speaking Swedish as one’s mother tongue. On Åland, in common with the rest of the Western world, identities are built upon language, gender, origins, sexuality, religion and many other factors. One can be a respected Ålander even if you have a different accent, are of a different religion to the majority, come from a different country or belong to a sexual minority. The challenge of our time is that the individual alone decides if he or she wants to be categorised as an Ålander, and that “we Ålanders” constitute an inclusive identity which permits other opinions of what it means to be Ålandic. Strong social cohesion is not weakened by diversity. On the contrary, the diversity of individualities represents a higher level, a democratic and equal community compared with an archaic belief that only certain qualities meet the criteria of Ålandic society according to language, descent and property ownership.

Modernity is deepened by globalisation, digitalisation and individual mobility. Borders and anachronistic norms which both discriminate and oppress are the curse of our times. On Åland, too.

When the Ålanders attained autonomy, this gave rise to a political, economic, social and cultural structure which made the Ålanders into something much more than merely islanders. The power of initiative, self-belief and stubbornness which exists in many island communities is fuelled by the intrinsic dynamic of autonomy and the desire to increasingly determine one’s own fate, pushed the Ålanders decidedly further forward than if Åland had simply become an island community on the periphery of either the archipelagic region of Turku or Roslagen.

For almost 100 years, the Ålanders have doggedly contributed to the development of Ålandic society, and the results are in many ways impressive and worthy of praise. The pragmatic attitude, despite ongoing resistance and backlash, has slowly and continually yielded results. The Ålanders have progressively made the transformation from political objects to political subjects, and who to an increasing extent govern their territory and themselves. Autonomy has long extended its achievements far beyond the limits of formal jurisdiction. This also applies to the demilitarised and neutralised status of Åland.

When my career in the Parliament of Åland ended in October 2015, that very same month the Government of Åland adopted a historical document entitled “Policy for Ålands demilitarising och neutralisering” (Policy for the demilitarisation and neutralisation of Åland). The work on the policy was conducted under the leadership of the incumbent Head of Government (lantråd) of Åland Camilla Gunell and Chief of Justice Michaela Slotte. The policy is a progress report and a comprehensive review of all possible aspects related to the specific international status of Åland. In retrospect, it is evident that the document was completed just in the nick of time. Following the emergence of the document, there has been a period of increased military tension in the Baltic Sea region, which also involved the demilitarisation and neutralisation of Åland. This is a phase that is still ongoing and once again means that the national defence forces and other military-obsessed powers are irritated by the horror vacui created by Åland, because they are unable to control the territory of the autonomy with all of their weapon technology and their uniform-clad chest-beating tones.

The document answers the initial question I posed regarding the competence and readiness of the authorities of autonomous rule and the political establishment to conduct their own actions within the realms of security policy, in particular aggressive military-political developments and opinions on how the demilitarisation and neutralisation of Åland should be adapted according to the requirements of today, whereby there is a wish to deviate from conventional rules and practices as well as the conclusions of customary law. A more dramatic example to illustrate this is Jussi Niinistö, the Minister of Defence’s proposal to abolish the right of Ålanders to be exempt from military service, and instead force the Ålanders who do not do military service to complete civil service. The proposal is a patriotic but hollow gesture, however one that has negative political effects which could potentially be somewhat troublesome.

This time, the elite of Åland will not stand by powerless. Instead, the Head of Government of Åland Katrin Sjögren and the Speaker of the Åland Parliament Johan Ehn give a powerful and objective defence. I quote:

“..."A connection is often made between demilitarisation and neutralisation on the one hand, and exemption from military service on the other, despite the fact that the regime was not originally intended for the sake of the Ålanders, but rather so that the Åland territory would not become a military threat to Sweden. Over time, however, the policy of demilitarisation and neutralisation combined with exemption from military service has been a strong contributing factor to the formation of identity, which has given rise to the concept ‘Islands of Peace,’ and Åland has come to be an internationally acclaimed example of security policy. In the changing reality in which we live today, we Ålanders will continue to stand up for this successful solution. It feels reassuring that the Government of Finland and especially the President of the Republic are clearly doing the same."
By way of introduction, I also touched upon civic Åland’s approach to the peace movement, and work for peace in general. One current case is the so-called peace conference Åland 17 which was held in September of this year at Gregersö parish in Jomala. Representatives from a peace association in Stockholm and Russian intellectual peace activists participated in the conference. The way in which the media and a number of politicians related to the conference made me think about a whole host of unpleasantness from my own time as a peace activist. To my mind, opinions that categorically assume all Russians represent an authoritarian and aggressive superpower under Putin’s dictatorship are prejudices, which were already being spread before the conference took place. There are opposition parties in Russia who really require support and respect. Prior to the meeting, Harry Jansson, the vice-chairman of the Jomala church delegation stated the following:

“Generally, as commercial leasers we do not get involved in activities so long as those hiring the space stick to the limits of the law. Of course there are limits as to what you can get up to in a church yard, but I find it difficult for the parish to take a political stance.”

The reason the Peace camp got such attention was because Finland’s former ambassador in Moscow, Hannu Himanen, approached the media and warned that the peace camp would be used by Putin for the purposes of propaganda. The very same Himanen had just released a book in which he advocates Finland should immediately seek membership of NATO. Naturally he is within his full rights to do so, but can he be believed with regards to the propaganda value of the peace camp to Putin, or could it be that Himanen himself is using the Peace camp to underpin his opinion on membership of NATO? Has anyone seen anything in the Russian media about the peace camp, and in that case, what have they written? A follow-up is in place. In times when there is far too much “fake news”, it is important to find out the truth. That several Åland opinion makers jumped on the descriptions of Åland17 in the media without knowing all the facts is up for debate. It shows that work for peace still holds great importance, especially if it includes Russians and Russia. In itself, it is understandable but it should not uncritically overshadow other ongoing discussions around peace concerning the international role and status of Åland.

Åland, with its special conditions, should give the concept of peace a renaissance, and the Islands of Peace should consciously and determinedly live up to their epithet, which is indeed not outdated but even more relevant than ever. It is not childish to work towards and stand for peace. Quite the opposite, it is time to keep check on all the martial beliefs which dictate that conflict can be resolved with violence. Instead, Åland can show a different path - a path which is led by humanism and respect for all living things. Peace is a vital element to the realisation of a sustainable Åland, and the goal should be the absence of all forms of violence.

The work for peace on Åland would benefit from further intensive work during times of détente and good neighbourly relations. Not just when we have a difficult situation, but also when daily life and the future looks bright and secure. This development has gone in the right direction. But in order to carry forward the ambitions of earlier generations towards demilitarisation and neutralisation as an ongoing project, we should make more effort to integrate the vision of peace firmly into the Ålandic identity. People of the world do not long for war, but for peace. We can lead the way and be a living example to show that this is possible, and that there are alternatives to violence and outdated military notions. And how do we do that? Yes, a tried-and-tested method is to give further support and money to the Åland Islands Peace Institute, which can provide the society of Åland with inspiration and knowledge on how the Islands of Peace can develop into an example for the world.
Call for Papers

The editors welcome submissions for articles that focus on, or relate to, the topics of security, autonomy, and minority issues. Apart from articles JASS also welcomes other kinds of contributions, such as essays, reviews, conference papers and project notes.

Articles should not exceed 12 000 words (excluding references) and be written in British or American English. For other contributions, such as book reviews, conference reports, project- and research notes, the maximum length is 4000 words. The layout of the text should be in single-column format and kept as simple as possible.

We cordially invite you to send synopsis of manuscript for initial feedback by 10th of January. Manuscripts to be considered for the I/2018 issue are invited for review by 1st of February 2018.

Also interested contributors intrigued by demilitarisation, neutralisation and security are invited to get in touch regarding issue II/2018 later next year.

Further details on the submission process can be found at www.jass.ax/submissions